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Part Three

THE FIFTH ANNUAL
ERNST C. STIEFEL SYMPOSIUM:
1945-1995: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE NUREMBURG TRIALS AND
STATE ACCOUNTABILITY

PANEL I.
TELFORD TAYLOR PANEL: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUREMBERG TRIAL
Ms. Suzy Littell
MS. SUZY LITTELL: Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to
welcome you on behalf of the New York Law School Journal of
Human Rights to the Fifth Annual Ernst Stiefel Symposium: Critical
Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State Accountability.
We are greatly indebted to Dr. Stiefel, an internationally
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recognized practitioner,' for his support of this and previous
symposia. Previous symposia have focused on foreign lawyers in
New York and New York lawyers abroad, the establishment of a
legal system in China after the cultural revolution, practicing law and
doing business in the Soviet Union, and the privatization of Eastern
Europe. Today we are honored to have with us participants from the
Nuremberg trials, as well as jurists and analysts in the field today.
It is my great pleasure to introduce and turn the podium over to Dean
Harry Wellington, Dean of New York Law School.

Dean Harry Wellington
DEAN HARRY WELLINGTON: Thank you very much Susan.
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome. This program is made possible by
the generosity and commitment of one of New York Law School's
most valued friends, Dr. Ernst Stiefel. I want to just take a moment
in order to say a few words about the fund and the man who created
it. Unfortunately, Dr. Stiefel is not here and, therefore, he will not
be embarrassed. If you know Dr. Stiefel, you know that it is
impossible to embarrass him.
Ernst has been a part of the New York Law School for over
twenty years and he has greatly strengthened this place by his
association with it. As a member of the school's adjunct faculty, Dr.
Stiefel has shared the original experience of half a century of practice
in the fields of international and foreign law. 2 Ernst was born and

'Dr. Stiefel was admitted in 1944 to the New York Bar; in 1952 to the U.S. District
Court, the Southern District of New York; and in 1971 to the District of Columbia. He
became a member of the German Bar in 1932 and a member of the English Bar
(Honorable Society of the Middle Temple, London) in 1938.
2 Dr. Stiefel's international legal activities include: Consultant: Office of Economic
Warfare, Washington, D.C., 1942-1943; Department of State, Washington, D.C., and
American Legation, Berne, Switzerland, 1945-1946; War Department, Office of Military
Government, Germany, 1946-1947. Panelist: Colloquium on Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, University of Virginia, 1977; Symposium on Foreign Investment in the
United States, 1979; Symposium on United States Investment in Europe, 1980;
Symposium on United States Investment in Eastern Europe, 1989; Symposium on
German Unification, 1990. Honorary Director: German-American Chamber of

Commerce, USA, 1980-present. Faculty Advisor: JOURNAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW, New York Law School, 1981-1987.
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raised in Germany where he earned his law degree. Facing the April
Laws issued by the Nazis against the Jewish professionals, 3 he
immigrated to France and England before finally entering the United
States in 1942. Dr. Stiefel, who was presented with a law school
honorary law degree from this school in 1988, practices with Coudert
Brothers and also with a firm in Germany. He advises European and
American companies on trade, investment, and economic matters.
He is one of the few lawyers to be a member of the German,
English and New York bars. He is also licensed to practice in
France. He has earned degrees from the University of Heidelberg,
Paris, and Strassburg. He has written many books and articles on
international legal issues, including discovery problems under the
Hague Convention and trade secrets in the United States in the
chemical and pharmaceutical industries.4
In 1987, Dr. Stiefel established the Ernst Stiefel Fund, a
major endowment supporting a wide range of products in the
comparative and international law program at New York Law School.
Dr. Stiefel will be at the lunch today, for those of you who are
attending the lunch, and he plans to speak to us. I hope you will all
come to hear him.
This is a very important symposium. I suppose at no time
in the last fifty years has the Nuremberg experience been more
important for us than it is today and we have an extraordinary group
of panelist to speak to us. We also have an extraordinary young

I The April Laws, promulgated on April 7, 1933, as the Law for the Reestablishment, provided for government control in removing or transferring civil service
officials for the purpose of re-establishing a loyal German civil service. Articles Three
and Four specifically provided that "officials of non-Aryan descent and officials who
because of their previous political activity do not offer security that they will act at all
ties and without reservation in the interests of the national state" were to be removed.
JEREMY NOAKES, DOCUMENTS ON NAZISM 1919-1945, at 228-31 (1975) (discussing the
Law for the Re-establishment of the Professional Civil Service; promulgated on April
7, 1933, these laws became known as the "April Laws."); See THE BLACK BOOK: THE
NAZI CRIME AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE 85, 470-74 (The Jewish Black Book Comm.,
1946) [hereinafter THE BLACK BOOK].
4 ERNST STIEFEL, PITFALLS IN U.S. COMMON MARKET JOINT VENTURES (1961);
ERNST STIEFEL, GERMAN COMMERCIAL LAW (1963); ERNST STIEFEL, DISCOVERY
PROBLEMS UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND GERMAN-AMERICAN LEGAL
ASSISTANCE (1983); ERNST STIEFEL, DOING BUSINESS IN GERMANY (1978); ERNST
STIEFEL, TENDENCIES IN PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. (1990).
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woman to introduce the panel, my colleague at New York Law
School, Professor Ruti Teitel. Ruti is a scholar in the areas of
constitutional law, religion in the First Amendment, the prosecution
of crimes against humanity worldwide, and criminal procedure under
repressive regimes. 5 As a faculty advisor to the New York Law
School Journalof Human Rights, it is Professor Teitel and the student
members of the journal to whom we owe thanks for being the
organizers of today's program. So let me ask Professor Teitel to
come up and introduce the panel.
Professor Ruti Teitel
PROFESSOR RUTI TEITEL: Thank you, Dean Wellington. I
welcome all of you on behalf of the New York School Journal of
Human Rights and the Ernst Stiefel Fund to our symposium on
Critical Perspectives on Nuremberg Trials and State Accountability.
Fifty years ago Justice Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the
United States, began his opening statement by saying the following:
The privilege of opening the first trial in history for
crimes against the peace of the world imposes a grave
The wrongs which we seek to
responsibility.
condemn and punish have been so calculated, so
malignant, so devastating that civilization cannot
tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive
their being repeated. 6
That opened the Nuremberg Trials of the Trial of the Major
War Criminals with a recognition that what had happened and the
atrocities that had been committed were aberrations; and Justice
Jackson signaled the grave responsibility of condemning and

5 See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Paradoxes in the Revolution of the Rule of Law, 19 YALE
J. INT'L L. 239 (1994); Ruti Teitel, Post-Communist Constitutionalism:A Transitional
Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167 (1993); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of
Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 CORN. L. REV. 747 (1993).
6 TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL

MEMOIR 167 (1992).

1995]

PANEL I

457

punishing. 7 Fifty years after Justice Jackson's inspiring address, we
have gathered to reflect on the meaning of that obligation, and upon
our grave responsibility in the current political and historical context.
Despite this century's sad record of persecution regarding
Armenia, Cambodia, the Kurds, and most recently, the Balkan
conflict, Rwanda, and the recent revelations of Burundi, as well as
war crimes all over the world, including those perpetrated by the
United States in Vietnam and throughout Central America' there has
been very little sense of the legal response to condemn and punish;
humanitarian intervention is rare. While we are sickened by the
absence of response, we are also somewhat hopeful and mindful that
we are meeting at an auspicious time.
It is a full half-century since Nuremberg and for the first time
there is an International Criminal Tribunal convening regarding
conflicts in the Balkans and in Rwanda. 9 The fate of these tribunals
remains uncertain, and it is in this political context that we gather
today to reconsider the meaning of Justice Jackson's words: What is
the nature of the obligation of law in its response to grave crimes of
the state?
We begin with reflections on the Nuremberg Trials by those
who were there. We are lucky to be joined by the leading
prosecutors and counsel, from the first trial, the Goering trial, as well
as from the Subsequent Proceedings. In the second panel we
consider other precedents, both past and contemporary, including
post-war trials, national trials, as well as more recent efforts

7 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 99 (1947) [hereinafter BLUE SERIES] "That four great nations, flushed with
victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their
captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that
Power has ever paid to reason."
'See, e.g., Francis V. Boyle, Determining U.S. Responsibilityfor Contra Operations
Under InternationalLaw, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 86, 92 (1987) (noting that the greater
public injury in Central America included crimes against humanity); Matthew Lippman,
The My Lai Massacre and the Vietnam War, 1 SAN DIEGO JUSTICE J. 295, 361 (1993)
(comparing the United States' involvement in Vietnam with Hitler's in Germany);
9
Statute of the InternationalTribunalfor Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (creating the
International Tribunal for Rwanda); Statute of the InternationalTribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia, annexed to Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. S.C. Doc. S/25704, para. 49 (1993).
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throughout Central America and in national trials in Ethiopia. We
will also explore the pros and cons of various fora for punishing war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The third panel is
the most contemporary.
It explores the current attempts in
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda to stop genocide, and considers the many
legal issues and problems that have arisen in the project of identifying
and prosecuting the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
attempted genocide committed in those regions. Joining us will be
prosecutors and political analysts to comment on those tribunals.
Now, I would like to begin with the first panel, which honors
Telford Taylor, who is with us today. He is sitting in the front row
and perhaps he needs no introduction, but I would like to say
something before I turn this over to Professor Bush. Professor
Telford Taylor was Assistant Prosecutor of the United States at the
first trial in Nuremberg and then became Chief Prosecutor in the
following trials. He is probably the single person in the twentieth
century who has most distinguished himself by his sustained
commitment over the last fifty years to law's response to injustice.
Even while active in litigating and writing against the horrors of
World War II and most recently in his important book, The Anatomy
of the Nuremberg Trials,'" he did not limit himself to analysis of that
repression. Rather, there is an utter coherence in his life's work.
When Telford Taylor returned from the war, he wrote and
litigated against the Soviet repression, and I recommend Courts of
Terror." He was also very active in the same period against what
was happening in the United States, in the McCarthy Era, and the
persecution of individuals throughout that period in the United States.
At that time, he wrote Grand Inquest,'2 and was a tireless advocate
on behalf of those falsely accused here. Telford Taylor was also
outspoken about United States war crimes committed in Vietnam, and
wrote Nuremberg and Vietnam 3 where he compared the war crimes

1oTAYLOR,

supra note 6.

"TELFORD

TAYLOR, COURTS OF TERROR (1976).

12

TELFORD

TAYLOR,

GRAND

INQUEST:

THE

STORY

OF CONGRESSIONAL

INVESTIGATIONS (1955).
3

TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1970)
(comparing the war crimes committed during the Vietnam War to those committed
during World War II).
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of that conflict with those committed during the World War II period.
Now, I would like to introduce the moderator of the Telford
Taylor panel, Professor Jonathan Bush.14 I came to know Jonathan
during his work at the Department of Justice concrning Nazi war
criminals who had been discovered to be living here. Jonathan is a
graduate of the Yale Law School and has written many articles and
books on war crimes and on slavery. 5 Jonathan is a friend of Telford
Taylor and co-taught with Telford, both at Cardozo Law School and
Columbia, so there's no one who is more eminently qualified to
moderate our first panel.
ProfessorJonathan Bush
PROFESSOR JONATHAN BUSH: Thank you very much, Ruti. I
would like to welcome everybody to this morning's first panel, which
will offer a rare view of the Nuremberg Trials.
Before we turn to that, let me begin by thanking our hosts,
Dean Wellington, New York Law School, the Journal of Human
Rights and its staff, Ernst Stiefel, and Professor Teitel. To all of
you, your vision, generosity and organizational skill have made
possible what should be an exciting day. The first and most famous
Nuremberg Trial was opened by the Big Four Allies in November
1945,6 and it lasted until October 1946.1' The next wave of
Nuremberg Trials consisted of twelve significant cases, the so-called
Subsequent Proceedings,' 8 tried under international authority by

'4 Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University; A.B., Princeton University,
1975; B.Litt., Trinity College, Oxford University, 1977; J.D., Yale University, 1980.
11 See, e.g., Jonathan Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its
Limitations, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 2022 (1993) [hereinafter Modern Law of War];
Jonathan Bush, The First Slave (and Why He Matters), 16 CARDOzO L. REV.
(forthcoming fall 1996).
16 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 165 ("The trial opened on the morning of
November 20, 1945, [and] we had our first look at the defendants.").
17 BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG xiii (1977).

181-15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS

UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1946-1949) [hereinafter GREEN SERIES]. After

the Nuremberg Trials proper, 12 additional trials, of some 185 defendants, were held
in Nuremberg from 1946 to 1949. These trials were called "Subsequent Proceedings"
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American prosecutors in Nuremberg from 1946 to 1949.19 Today's
panel offers an extraordinary vantag6 point from which to view both
sets of Nuremberg Trials.
This year, as Dean Wellington noted, marks the fiftiethanniversary of the start of Nuremberg. Conferences have and will be
held, and books written, to examine the legacy of those critical
international trials.2° Equally important, with new international
tribunals established to try genocide in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia, 2' parallels will be drawn and lessons-right or
wrong-articulated. Probably never in the past half-century has it
been so true that the legacy of Nuremberg is in the air and up for
grabs.
I thought about this a few days ago when I had the pleasure
of hearing my first boss, Allan Ryan, formerly head of the Justice
Department's Office of Special Investigations, as he surveyed the
implications of Nuremberg. For some observers, Ryan noted,
Nuremberg is a great success, a milestone in international law. As
American Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson put it so memorably, "That
four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power
has ever paid to Reason." 22 Meanwhile, to its critics, Nuremberg is
a failure, a dead-end, a set of potential legal teachings that were

to distinguish them from the initial International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The
Subsequent Proceedings were held by the Military Government of the American and
French Zones of Occupation in Germany, pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10. See
Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes
Tribunal, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77, 102, (1994).
9 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at xii.
20 See, e.g., Richard Saltus, Nazi ProsecutorsLook Back 50 Years Later, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1995, at 30 (discussing a conference held at Boston College Law School
commemorating the Nuremberg trials).
2 See, e.g., Daniel B. Pickard, Security Council Resolution 808: A Step Toward A
PermanentInternational Courtfor the Prosecution of International Crimes and Human
Rights Violations, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 435, 435 (1995) (discussing the historic
and present attempts to create an international tribunal to prosecute human rights
violations in Rwanda and Yugoslavia); see supra note 9 (listing the official citations for
the documents establishing the Rwandan and Yugoslavian tribunal).
22 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY

TRIBUNAL 99 (opening speech of Justice Jackson, Nov. 21, 1945.
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less
never applied in subsequent courts of law and that were more or
23
by-passed by lawyers until the end of the Cold War and after.
As for the conduct of the Nuremberg Trials, most observers
see them as fair and just.24 The British Chief Judge, Lord Lawrence,
knew the value of the old maxim "justice must be seen to be done."
Even more important was that the trial passed the real acid test for
fairness: three of the twenty-two individual Nazi defendants and
three of the six accused organizations in the first trial were
acquitted.2" To other observers, though, the trials were mere victors'
justice, in which ex post facto substantive rules were applied under
novel jurisdictional theories to try persons who, under traditional law,
had valid defenses to every charge. 26
In fact, everywhere there is a strange disconnect between the
different views of how Nuremberg should be understood. Realists
see Nuremberg as the contextually grounded, and by no means
inevitable, political response to total victory over a monstrous foe. 27
Meanwhile, the human rights community often sees Nuremberg as a
starting point for an emerging but already well-developed
international legal framework under which the conduct of war and the
regime of state sovereignty are limited by the accountability of
23 See generally JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 442 (1994)

(exposing the failure of the courts to apply the Nuremberg principles immediately after
the trial).
24 See, e.g., id. at 440 (stating that "Nuremberg may have been flawed law, but it
was satisfying justice.").
2 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 546-70.
26 See, e.g., Modern Law of War, supra note 15, at 2023 ("Certainly the failure
actively to persuade the average German that Nuremberg was conducted fairly-justice
must be seen to be done, runs the old adage-meant that many Germans assumed that
regardless of their former leaders' guilt, the rules of international law were merely
victors' justice."); Melissa Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of the International
Criminal TribunalforRwanda, 1 INT'L L. STUDENTS Ass'N J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217,

226 (1995) (noting that the Nuremberg trials "have been sternly criticized for violations
of due process, judicial bias, and unconventional procedural mechanisms"); Matthew
Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 17, 38 (1991)
(paraphrasing Professor Bernard Meltzer who "conceded that the Allies' selective
prosecution .contributed to the perception of victors' justice").
27See, e.g., Modern Law of War, supra note 15, at 2064 (stating that "[s]ignificant
opposition in the former Allied nations was confined to foreign policy 'realists' who
rejected a moralistic international law and multilateral institutions that might someday
be turned against the United States").
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individuals and groups to tough criminal sanctions. Skeptics point to
the almost total absence of subsequent enforcement,2" supporters point
to the less tangible, but perhaps no less real, pedagogic and moral
gains .29 They trace to Nuremberg the analytical tools with which we
discuss, expose and condemn some state-sanctioned abuses abroad
and, occasionally, at home.3 °
With opinions as divided as this on almost every aspect of
Nuremberg, one could only conclude, as Ryan did, that the historical
record of what went on at Nuremberg is not only not a good, clear
legal guide to the future, it may not even be a good guide to the past.
To begin to answer some of these historical and legal
questions, I am personally honored to present the extraordinary group
of Nuremberg experts on this morning's panel. I will introduce them
all now, in the order in which they will speak. To make sure we
have plenty of time for all the speakers and our commentator and still
have time for your questions, which we invite, I ask the speakers to
stay within a twenty minute time maximum, and ask the audience to
hold your questions until the very end, after the panelists have all
spoken.
As for substance, in planning the panel we have not carved
out the topics in any hard-and-fast way. I have, however, asked the
panelists to speak in the order that corresponds to the order of their
participation in Nuremberg. I want them to feel free to focus on their
personal experience: how they got to Nuremberg, what they did
there, what they feel were the strengths and perhaps the flaws of their
cases and of the trials generally, as well as to discuss the larger legal
and historical lessons of Nuremberg.
Our first speaker will be Mr. Robert Wolfe, who will provide
a survey of the legal background of Nuremberg. Educated at the
University of Vermont, New York Law School, New York
28 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 4.
29See, e.g., id. ("As a moral and legal statement, clothed with judicial precedent and

United Nations recognition, the Nuremberg principles are an international legal force to
be reckoned with.").
30 "After Nuremberg, state-sponsored murder was declared to be a crime against
humanity under international war. This was not the invention of law but rather a
codification of emerging war." Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Nuremberg Precedentand
the Prosecutionof State-Sponsored Mass Murder, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 325, 326 (1990).
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University and Columbia, Mr. Wolfe was, until his recent retirement,
the long-time director of the United States Archives, Captured
German and Related Records Division, 3' which meant, for our
purposes, he was the custodian of almost all of the Nuremberg Trial
records. I first met Mr. Wolfe when I was the most junior Nazi
prosecutor in the Justice Department and he was recommended to me
as the only man who knew where everything was. I found that to be
largely true, and I know that the Office of Special Investigators relied
on his help in many cases. Mr. Wolfe has lectured and written
widely on the topic of Nuremberg,32 and he has testified as an expert
witness in Nazi Trials in Germany and Australia.33 He also has a
personal connection with Nuremberg: during preparations of the
Doctors' Trial,34 copies of the evidence on medical experimentation
were locked in his military government safe in Heidelberg, where
they were consulted by the authors of the classic book on the topic,
the title of which in English is The Dictate of Contemptfor Humanity.
Following him will be Mr. William Jackson, who was at the
first Nuremberg Trial and the London Conference in the summer of
1945, and who planned Nuremberg. Educated at Yale University and
Harvard Law School, Mr. Jackson has a long, distinguished career
after Nuremberg in practice, as a litigation partner with the firm of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. He also authored an influential
assessment of Nuremberg not long after his return in 1947 which

" Mr. Wolfe is a former Director of the United States Archives and Captured
Records and served as the Custodian of International and Subsequent Nuremberg Trial
Records for the National Archives and Records Administration, Captured German and
Related Records (NNRM) from 1962 through 1994.
3 In 1972, Mr. Wolfe was a guest lecturer in Government at Wesleyan University,
teaching a course entitled The Trials of the Nazi War Criminals: Validity and
Applicability of the Judgment at Nuremberg; in 1975, he served as the Director of the
Conference Group on German Politics Symposium and delivered a speech entitled
Nuremberg Trials as History, Law, and Morality; in 1985, he was a panelist at
Symposium on the Nuremberg Trials, Athenaeum, Claremont McKenna College. See,
e.g., Robert Wolf, Putative Threat to National Security as a Nuremberg Alibi for
Genocide, 450 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. 46 (1980).
11For example, on October 5, 1992, Mr. Wolfe testified as an expert archival
witness in a Nazi war-crimes case tried by the County Court of Duisberg, Germany; on

November 15, 1993, he testified in the pre-trial hearings of a Nazi war-crimes case in
Southern Adelaide, Australia.
34 1 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, at 915-24 (Case No. 1, United States v. Brandt).
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appeared in Foreign Affairs Magazine."
Mr. Jackson had a very special vantage point at Nuremberg,
since he went first as Executive Assistant to his father, Justice Robert
Jackson. Partly because of that connection, Mr. Jackson has been
interviewed before about Nuremberg, but I very much look forward
to his sharing with us the perspective of one who saw Nuremberg
from the very top, as it were.
Speaking next will be Professor Emeritus, Bernard Meltzer,
who participated in the first trial and worked in particular on the
economic team in presenting the case against Walter Funk, Nazi
Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank. 36 Educated
at the University of Chicago, University of Chicago Law School and
Harvard Law School, Professor Meltzer practiced law with a number
of firms, served as special assistant to both Jerome Frank at the
Securities and Exchange Commission and Dean Acheson, when
Acheson was Assistant Secretary of State, and taught at the
University of Chicago. He has written case books and a large
number of law review articles, and it is no exaggeration to say that
Professor Meltzer has long been our nation's leading labor law
expert." But buried deep in his long lists of publications on labor
law and criminal law, there are also works related to the issues of
Nuremberg, ranging from his readings on International Organization 8
to his essays on Nuremberg39 and on Calley. 4°
Following Professor Meltzer and our short break will be
3 William Jackson, Putting the Nuremberg Law to Work, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 550
(1947).
36 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 264 (stating that the "two banker
defendants-Hjalinar Schacht and Walter Funk-were dealt with by two American Junior
Counsel, respectively Brady Bryson and Bernard Meltzer, both naval lieutenants").
17 See, e.g., Bernard D. Meltzer, The Weber Case: The JudicialAbrogation of the
Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 466 (1980);
BERNARD

D.

MELTZER

&

W.G.

KATZ,

CASES

AND

MATERIALS

ON BUSINESS

CORPORATIONS (1949); BERNARD D. MELTZER & S. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (1985).
MELTZER, SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
38 BERNARD

ORGANIZATIONS (mimeographed) (1947).
39 Bernard Meltzer, A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate, 14 U. CHI.
L. REV. 455 (1947).
4
Meltzer, Some Uneasy Reflections on the Calley Case, 18 U.CHIC. L. SCH. REC.
13 (1971).
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Judge Cecelia Goetz, who was at Nuremberg working on the Krupp
case from 1946 to 1948.4' Educated with three degrees from New
York University,42 Judge Goetz has had a long, distinguished career
in both private practice and public service, with the Office of Price
Stabilization and the Civil Division, the United States Department of
Justice, and culminating with her service as a judge in the Federal
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York.43 Of all the
Nuremberg alumni on today's panel, Judge Goetz alone, I believe,
has not published her impressions on the trials, and for that reason I
am particularly interested in her describing her work on the
"industrialists' case."
Presenting last will be Mr. Drexel Sprecher, sitting to my
left, who was part of the Nuremberg team from beginning to end,
from the summer of 1945 through the first trial, where he prosecuted
Hans Fritzsche and Baldur von Schirach, through the entirety of the
subsequent proceedings where he worked on the Ministries case and
was chief of the trial team on the I.G. Farben case." No less
significant is that Mr. Sprecher then stayed on in Nuremberg for two
more years to edit the indispensable volume record of the Subsequent
Proceedings-widely known in the trade as the "Green Series" 45 due
to the color of its covers. Educated at the University of Wisconsin
and at Harvard Law School, Mr. Sprecher has a varied and

41

United States v. Alfried Krupp, 9 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18 (Case No. 10)

908-22; See,e.g., WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE ARMS OF KRUPP: 1587-1968, 659, 708,
717, 718, 763, 891, 963 (1968) (discussing Judge Goetz's participation in the Krupp
case).
42 Judge Goetz received a B.A. and an LL.B. in 1940 and an LL.M in Taxation in
1957 from New York University.
"3Associate Counsel, Nuremberg War Crimes Counsel, 1946-48; Assistant Chief
Counsel, Office of Price Stabilization, 1952; U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division,
1952-53; Special Master, New York Supreme Court, 1977-78; United States Bankruptcy
Judge, Eastern District of New York, 1978-83.
4 United States v. von Weizsaecker, 12 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18 (Case No. 11,
The Ministries Case); United States v. Krauch, 7-8 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18 (Case
No. 6, The Farben Case); See, e.g., Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and
International Law, 450 INT'L CONCILIATION 241, 314 n.188 (1949) (discussing
Sprecher's prominence in the Farben case); PERSICO, supra note 23, at 81, 217-21, 27374, 300-01 (discussing the case against von Schirach and the case against Fritzsche);
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 267.
45 See 1-15 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18.
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distinguished career in public service, which includes the Office of
Strategic Services, in private practice, in real estate development,
with George Washington University and with the Democratic
National Committee. Because of Mr. Sprecher's familiarity with the
negotiations leading up to the first trial, with both phases of
Nuremberg, and with the trial records themselves, 46 I have asked him
to be our cleanup hitter, speaking to whatever topics our other
speakers have left out, though, in truth, I look forward to whatever
he chooses to address.
So illustrious a panel would be enough to crown any
conference on Nuremberg, but we have two additional personages in
our midst. Joining us as commentator will be Professor Emeritus
Herbert Wechsler. Even in a group of lawyers as distinguished as
this, Professor Wechsler cuts an extraordinary figure. Educated at
City College and Columbia Law School, Professor Wechsler was law
secretary Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and has practiced and taught
law, principally at Columbia University.
As for the personal touch, like generations of students, I was
taught in law school in my Federal Jurisdiction course that a mythical
two-headed creature named "Hart and Wechsler" were the only
people that ever really understood the topic of Federal Jurisdiction.
Years later, when I began to teach criminal law, I learned that only
the chief drafter of the celebrated Model Penal Code, the same
Professor Wechsler,47 ever really understood criminal law. Professor
Wechsler's relationship to Nuremberg, as insiders know, was a
critical one. As Assistant Attorney General in the wartime Roosevelt
Administration, Professor Wechsler was a leading figure in the
interdepartmental planning for post-war trials.4" During the first
Nuremberg trials, he was the principal technical and legal advisor for
the American judges. Professor Wechsler has previously offered only

Drexel Sprecher was Deputy Chief Counsel and Director of Publications, Office
U.S. Chief Counsel War Crimes. PERISCO, supra note 23, at 274.
"I See Sir Leon Radzinowicz, Herbert Wechsler's Role in the Development of
American CriminalLaw and Penal Policy, 69 VA. L. REV. 1 (1983).
4
See BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE
DOCUMENTARY RECORD 1944-1945, at 52-54, 84-90, 140-41 (1982) [hereinafter
AMERICAN ROAD]; SMITH, supra note 17, at 33, 38, 43 (1977); TAYLOR, supra note 6,
at 41, 75.
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brief assessments of Nuremberg.49 I am, therefore, most eager to
hear what Professor Wechsler, as one of our nation's leading legal
thinkers and, in particular, as someone who was known for his
cautious view of certain legal theories argued at the Nuremberg
trials," has to say about the conduct and legacy of the main
Nuremberg Trial.
Finally, joining us as honoree rather than a speaker, but
warmly invited to join in if the spirit so moves him, is Professor
Emeritus, General Telford Taylor. Telford is the guest of honor of
today's program. Rather than preempt the award's presentation, I
will simply say that Telford Taylor is an extraordinary lawyer,
high-minded yet successful, aggressive yet principled, as well as
being the only person in this room who has been played by Richard
Widmark in a major Hollywood motion picture. 51 He was an
Associate Counsel on the American team at the first Nuremberg Trial
and was Chief of Counsel at the Subsequent Proceedings, and he has
written widely on Nuremberg and the law of war.52 He has been a
friend and a hero to many here today, and to me. I am honored that
he is with us today and I invite him, like Professor Wechsler, to
comment as desired or take questions informally during our coffee
break. Let me now turn things over to Robert Wolfe.

4 HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW

138-57

(1961).
50 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 116-20, 134-36; TAYLOR, supra note 6, at
119, 226, 398, 469, 549-53, 557, 572.
5' JUDGMENT AT NUREMBURG (United Artists 1961).
52
See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBURG TRIALS, supra

note 6; TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY supra
note 13; TELFORD TAYLOR, GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE THIRD REICH (1970);
Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and InternationalLaw, supra note 46;
Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 488 (1955).
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Mr. Robert Wolfe
MR. ROBERT WOLFE: Whenever I am asked to speak, the first
thing I do is count the house. If it is less than thirteen, it is a
seminar and I sit down. If it is more than thirteen, it is a lecture and
I stand up. I am going to break the rule today. Since everyone else
is sitting, I am going to sit down but I will lecture.
My fellow panelists in this conference session are attorneys
and former members of the Nuremberg trials' courts or prosecution
staffs. I am neither, but I do have an indirect, contemporaneous, as
well as a career-long, post-Nuremberg association.
During
preparations for the "Medical Case," 53 copies of the seized evidence
of forced experiments on concentration camp inmates-high altitude
and cold-water immersion- were locked in my military government
office safe in Heilberg where they were consulted by Alexander
Mitscherlicj and Fred Mieke in preparing the German classic Der
Diktat der Menschenverachtung (The Dictated Contempt for
Humanity) published in 1947 by one of my licensed publishers.54 My
other Nuremberg involvement has been as custodian of the official
trial records at the National Archives for some thirty years.
I call this presentation "Prelude to Nuremberg-A Flawed
Compromise." Judging by Telford Taylor's account in his Anatomy
of Nuremberg, when he accepted an assignment to the prosecution
staff he had little prior knowledge of the foregoing American and
Four-Power planning and negotiations which established the
Nuremberg canon.55 Excepting Messrs. William Jackson and Herbert
Wechsler, the same is probably true of the other members of this
panel, but no doubt they soon acquainted themselves with that
background. Since that was many years ago, the conveners of this
conference have asked me to review that part of the official records
deposited in the National Archives to refresh the memories of our

53United States v. Brandt, 1 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, at 909-25 (Case no. 1,
"The Medical Case").
5 LAMBERT S. HEIDELBERG, DIKTAT DER MENSCHENVERACHTUNG (1947).
s1 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at xi.
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panelists and enlighten the audience where necessary. 56

Franklin Delano Roosevelt's penchant for keeping his options
opened stymied American planning, let alone decisions, on
prosecution of war criminals until well into 1944. Meanwhile, a
Declaration of Allied Countries Occupied by Germany was drafted by
emigrant governments-in-exile at St. James Palace in London in
January 1942; 57 a Joint Declaration of Allied Governments in July
1942 which threatened retribution for crimes specifically against
Jews; 58 and the Moscow Declaration of the Three Power Conference
on November 1943, 59 which warned individual perpetrators that they
could not escape the consequences of their misdeeds. To that end,
the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) was
established by the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in London
on October 20, 1943, to assemble evidence of war crimes and
compile lists of accused for exchange through the Central Registry of
War Criminals and Security Suspects (CROWCASS). But the
UNWCC was bypassed by the Soviet Union, which set up a parallel
Extraordinary Commission. 6'
Returning from a European trip in late August, 1944,
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry James Morgenthau, Jr., discovered
in a War Department draft handbook dated for issuance on September
1, plans, which he complained to President Roosevelt, proposed too

5 Pertinent National Archives and Records Administration holdings, listed in Federal
Executive Branch hierarchical descent, may be found in the Roosevelt, Truman, and
Eisenhower Presidential libraries; in War, State, Navy, Justice and Treasury cabinet
department records; for the European Theater records of the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), in U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET), in
U.S. Office of Military Government, Germany (OMGUS), in International Military
Tribunal (IMT), Office of Chief Counsel for War Crimes (OCCWC), and for the trials
held at Dachau in records of the Judge Advocate General (JAG, National Archives
Record Groups 153 & 338), as well as on microfilm of captured German records; for
the Pacific Theater in records of the International Military Tribunal Far East (IMTFE),
International Prosecution Service (IPS), and Class B and C cases.
51 See, e.g., EDMUND J. OSMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS
904 (1985) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.N.]; TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 25.
58See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 26.
5 See, e.g., id. at 29; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.N., supra note 57, at 904.
60
See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 26-28 (stating that the UNWCC was politically weak
and played no significant role in shaping the Nuremberg enterprise).
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soft treatment of postwar Germany. 6 Roosevelt, in a memorandum
of August 26 to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, ordered the
draft withdrawn and revised: "This so-called 'Handbook' is pretty
bad . . . . It gives me the impression that Germany is to be
restored . . . .Your main and immediate task . . . is to get things
running . . . to restore as quickly as possible the official functioning
of the German civil government .
"..
62 In addition, Roosevelt
wrote:
I do not want [the Germans] to starve ... but ... if
they need food to keep body and soul together . . .
they should be fed three times a day . . . from Army
soup kitchens . . . .The fact that they are a defeated
nation, collectively and individually, must be so
impressed on them that they will hesitate to start any
new war . . . .I see no reason for starting a WPA,
PWA, or a CCC for Germany... 63
Given President Roosevelt's attitude, it is not surprising that,
at the second Quebec (Octagon) Conference of September 1944,
Morgenthau temporarily persuaded Roosevelt and Churchill to
endorse his economic plan for "an agricultural and pastoral"
Germany, as well as a less publicized provision for summary
execution of Nazi leaders and war criminals' which dovetailed with
a repeatedly expressed British aversion to a judicial process. 65 But
the disastrous economic consequences of a depressed Central Europe,
as foreseen by John Maynard Keynes, were fresh in the memory of
Americans of the generations of Secretary of War Stimson and
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. Neither however,

61 See,

e.g.,

SMITH,

6 AMERICAN ROAD,

supra note 17, at 34.
supra note 48, at 20-21.

6 Id.
6 See id. at 27 (referring to a communication in the Morgenthau Diary from
Morgenthau to Roosevelt on September 5, 1944).
1 See id. at 16-17 (referring to a memorandum from British Ambassador Halifax to
Secretary of State Hull, August 19, 1944); id. at 31 (referring to Sir John Simon's
memorandum of September 9, 1944, to the British War Cabinet recommending that
American agreement be sought for summary execution of major war criminals).
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intended soft treatment for Germany, and the harshness of JCS 106766
certainly reflected that attitude. Stimson, aided by a press leak and
resulting public protest, convinced President Roosevelt to distance
himself from both Morgenthau's pastoral and drumhead execution
proposals,67 leading at least to substantial American unanimity on

judicial prosecution rather than drumhead political purges .68 But that
unanimity did not extend to the crimes to be charged.
Meanwhile, Colonel Murray C. Bernays, of the War
Department's Personnel Division, the self-designated "sparkplug" of
war crimes prosecution, by September 15, 1944, had drawn up plans
that met War Department needs and particularly Stimson's
predilection for conspiracy indictments. 69 The accused Nazis were to
be charged with the commission of, and participation in, a conspiracy
and common plan to commit Crimes Against the Peace, War Crimes,
and Crimes Against Humanity.70 Also included was a charge of
collective criminality against those Nazi organizations deemed to be
the chief instruments of such crimes. 7 ' These tandem charges of
criminal conspiracy against both individuals and organizations were
intended for the corollary purposes of reaching the master planners
through the specific acts of their subordinate executors, and of
reaching a large number of persons through the trial or trials of a

' "JCS 1067 was the policy directive for postdefeat Germany." Id. at 229; "It is
believed that this directive should provide explicitly for effective steps leading to
punishment of those criminal acts committed by enemy nationals against other enemy
nationals . . . ." id. at 57.
67 See, e.g., AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 9.
(1 Perhaps, unconsciously, the lawyers involved-Stimson, McCloy, Bernays, even
Roosevelt-could not resist the temptation to make new and badly needed international
law, no matter the difficulties and the risks. But Secretary of State Hull, at the Moscow
Conference of October-November, 1943, openly stated his preference for quick courtmartials and execution of Nazi leaders. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 1289.
69"Bernays proposed to deal with the problem of defendants numbering in six or
seven figures by indicting the Nazi organizations, and providing that once the
organization was convicted on the conspiracy charge, all its members would be found
guilty upon proof of membership." TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 36, 37
70 Id. at 295-96.
7' See, e.g., id. at 36; see also AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 33-37
(recommending that the Nazi Government, its parties, and state agencies be charged with
conspiracy to commit murder, terrorism, and the destruction of the peaceful population
in violation of the laws of war).
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relatively few representative organizational leaders.7 2
What seems to be a miscalculation of the need for a
conspiracy charge arose from the assumption that the chief evidence
against the accused Nazi leaders would have to be elicited mainly
from testimony taken in direct and cross-examination. 73 No one
anticipated that tons of incriminating Nazi paperwork, much of it
signed or initialed by the accused, would fall into Allied hands,
obviating much of the need for oral testimony. This tremendous
amount of records had to be sifted through and it was amazing that
they were able in the short time allowed to mount any kind of a
prosecution.74 If I see the flaws in the translation now, it is because
they were working against having to translate hundreds of copies in
the court every day.75
Bernays was aware that there would be strong legal inhibitions
against charging crimes under international law to the German
persecution of German Jews, particularly before the outbreak of
war, 76 because the prohibition against foreign intervention in domestic
affairs goes back at least to Hugo Grotius, the father of modern
international law. 76 Bernays hoped, however, to employ his pet
gambit of conspiracy to punish such persecutions, which began with
the advent of Nazi power in 1933, on the grounds that these were
"preparatory acts inside the Reich in order to regiment the state for
[external] aggressions," as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe formulated it

72 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra

note 6, at 35-36.

71 Confronted with the diffficulty of obtaining evidence to convict all of the

individuals, Colonel Bernays proposed that the Nazi Organization be charged with
conspiracy. See, e.g., id. at 35.
74
See, e.g., EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIALS OF THE GERMANS 2 (1966) (referring
to the truckloads of incriminating documents coming into Nuremberg and the difficulty
the prosecution had when trying to master all the information).
71 See, TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 175 (stating that the translators had to work into
the early hours of the morning to supply the attorneys with the translations of the
necessary documents).
76 See, TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 35 (discussing that Bernays concerns over the
prosecution of Nazi crimes which occurred prior to the war, also led to the conspiracy
charge).
76 INTERNATIONAL LAW at xxxvii (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1987) (giving brief
background of Grotius and crediting him with the establishment of natural law).
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during the London Conference.77
In December 1944, Colonel William Henry Chanler of the
War Department, Civil Affairs Division,78 doubting that domestic
crimes could be tried as an illegal conspiracy under international law,
suggested that military government courts would have the right to try
culprits by German law, substituting for defunct indigenous courts. 79
Bernays countered that religious and political persecutions had not
constituted a violation of German Law under the Third Reich, so that
to punish their perpetrators as war criminals would set the precedent
of an international right to sit in judgment on the conduct of the
several states toward their own nation . . . [an] open door to
incalculable consequences . . . endangering our own status. 8"

77U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No.

3080, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED

STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS

329-47 (1949) [hereinafter REPORT]. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Deputy Chief Prosecutor
for the British, represented Great Britain in drawing up the London Agreement, id. at
xiii-xiv. The minutes of the London Conference sessions published in the REPORT are
transcriptions of stenographic notes taken by Elsie Douglas, secretary to Justice Jackson,
recording spoken English or interpretation from French or Russian.
78Colonel William C. Chanler was the Deputy Director of Military Government in
the War Department Civil Affairs Division. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 37.
7Id. at 37 n.t:
Chanler's theory was based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and his
arguments were intended to get around the omission in the pact of
any explicit proviso that waging aggressive war was criminal. Since,
however, the signatory nations did "condemn recourse to war" and
"renounce it as an instrument of national policy," Chanler argued
that if any of the signatories should violate the pact by aggressively
invading another country, the aggressor would lose the rights of a
lawful belligerent. Its acts of war in the invaded country would
therefore be murders and assaults under the domestic law of the
invaded country. Thus Poland, Belgium, and the other countries
invaded by Germany could demand the extradition of the German
leaders, and the charges against them would not be stated as
violations of the pact but as murders and other crimes under those
countries' own laws.
Id.
Id.at 35-36:
Bernays resorted to the Anglo-American law of criminal conspiracy,
proposing that the Nazi organizations and their leading members be
charged, before an international court, not merely with atrocious
violations of the laws of war, but with conspiring (presumably from
the beginning of the Nazi period in 1933 or earlier) to commit such
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The safer course, in Bernays' farseeing view, was to construe
Nazi domestic crimes as preparatory-a dress rehearsal-for the
conspiracy to wage illegal war. 8 '
With President Roosevelt still not showing his hand at the turn
of the year 1945, planning for war crimes prosecution was at an
impasse.82 General Myron C. Cramer of the War Department's
Judge Advocate General's office objected to prosecution of any
charges beyond conventional war crimes-Judge Advocate General
and State were at odds on the need for and advisability of a treaty
court 3-while Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler,
to practically every
supported by attorney Francis Biddle, objected
84
facto.
post
ex
as
plan
Bernays'
the
of
feature
By January 1945, the appalling news of the Malmedy
Massacre of American soldiers revived the moribund War
Department proposal, with the Justice Department now on board with
skillful corrections supplied by Mr. Wechsler, and government-wide
coordination orchestrated by Judge Samuel I. Rosenman at President

violations.
Id.
82See id. at 36 (stating Bernays' reasoning that if Nazi leaders had agreed prior to

war to commit violations of war, this preparation could be punishable as conspiracy to
commit wartime atrocities).
8 Id. at 34. President Roosevelt, dissatisfied with the events of a meeting in Quebec
with Churchill where they initiated the Morgenthau Plan, told the State Department that
he left Washington with "no presidential guidance on war crimes policy formulation.";
see also AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 10 (discussing Roosevelt's reaction to
Morgenthau's political victory in Quebec which threw war crimes policy "wide open").
83 The War Department's principal lawyer, Judge Advocate General Myron C.
Cramer, followed a thoroughly conventional approach, in contrast to Bernays proposals
which ultimately became the basis for the "Nuremberg Ideas."; See TAYLOR, supra note
•6, at 35; Cramer indicated his belief that "simple court procedures" should be used as
the basis of the Nuremberg Trials. AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 8.
84See AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 84-90 (Document 29, Wechsler to Biddle
on Bernays's proposal, Dec. 29, 1944); id. at 52; see also TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 75,
119. The American judges, including Wechsler and Biddle, were in frequent conference
over Bernays's proposals. Biddle was especially troubled by Bernays' "organizational
guilt" idea, the purpose of which was to obtain a judgment of criminality after a single
trial, followed by the automatic convictions of members who had joined the Nazi
organization voluntarily. Under this plan, punishments could be imposed in summary
proceedings against hundreds of thousands of members. Id.
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Roosevelt's behest.8 5 Yet there is no concrete evidence in the record
that the prosecution of war crimes was discussed at Yalta the
following month, although the final communiqu6 recalled that the
United Nations had decided at Moscow in November 1943, "to
punish justly and rapidly all war criminals." 6 Further, the Rosenman
mission to London as late as early April showed how far apart British
and American views were on prosecution of Nazi crimes,7
But late in April, public outrage at the uncovering of
systematic mass murder in concentration camps overrun by Allied
forces consolidated international public support for drastic punishment
of the perpetrators. With the characteristically decisive backing of
the new President, Harry S. Truman, Assistant Secretary of War
John J. McCloy and Judge Rosenman injected a moral urgency that
carried the day for the American war crimes plan presented at the
San Francisco Conference establishing the United Nations on April
30,88 and survived the London negotiations the following summer.
At the beginning of May, President Truman appointed
Associate Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as United States
Chief of Counsel for preparing and prosecuting war crimes against
the European Axis powers.89 Already the day before his appointment
was announced, Jackson had criticized the latest American draft.
While expressing his desire for simple, flexible procedures, he

85 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 39 (stating that political pressure was fast mounting
following the Malmedy Massacre); AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 98-105, 126-29
(reproducing Docs. 31 and 37, and stating that proponents of the conspiracy theory were
saved from defeat due to the impact of the Maledy Massacre).
'6 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 57, at 504.
87 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 32 (explaining that President Harry Truman clearly
opposed the British summary-execution plan, and supported the establishment of a
tribunal to try the Nazi leaders); see REPORT, supra note 77, at 18-20 (reprinting a
memorandum from the British stating their opinion that "execution without trial is the
preferable course"); see also AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 149 (Doc. 45,
Memorandum dated April 6, 1945, to Judge Rosenman from Lord Simon setting forth
another British plan of dealing with the war criminals without a tribunal, but without
summary-execution).
I REPORT, supra note 77, at 28-38 (reprinting the American memorandum presented
at the San Francisco Conference).
I REPORT, supra note 77, at 21 (Document IH,the Executive Order 9547, May 2,
1945, appointing Jackson as Chief Counsel for Nuremberg); see TAYLOR, supra note 6,
at 40.
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emphasized his determination that "this becomes one of the basic
documents in international law

.

.

.

[but this draft was] too

impassioned and gives the impression that it is setting up a court
organized to convict .

. .

. [I]ts future credit will be greatly aided if

it is a colder toned instrument."' This was followed by a series of
redrafts involving many contributors, but clearly dominated by
Jackson's requirements."
One month later, Telford Taylor, then a novice in war crimes,
as was virtually everyone else, encountered for the first
time in June
1945, the nascent American prosecution plan. Seeking to get down
to its essence, he concluded that the positive purpose of the trial was
"to give meaning to the War against Germany"9 2-to

paraphrase

Frank Capra: to explain why we fought. Taylor sensed that
augmenting Jackson's paramount purpose to codify morality in
international law, Bernays' burning determination to punish Nazi
crimes against humanity, and McCloy's concern to provide the
United States Army with the means for participation in a successful
quadripartite occupation of Germany, were the political justifications
for the extraordinary legal effort required
[to) validate casualties we have caused. To show why
those things had to be done. The conviction and
punishment of Axis criminals

. . .

will help to make

the war meaningful and valid for the people of the
Allied Nations and, it is not beyond hope, for at least
some people of the Axis Nations.93
The procedures and substance of the International Military
Tribunal ("IMT") at Nuremberg were proscribed by the London
"Agreement and Charter for the Prosecution of the Major War

90 See AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 180-81 (Doc. 52, Memorandum
concerning the document entitled "Punishment of War Criminals," April 28, 1945).
91See AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 181-87 (Doc. 53), 193-99 (Doc. 55), 203-

09.
91TAYLOR,

supra note 6, at 50.

93 AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 209.
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Criminals of the European Axis," 94 hammered out with considerable
difficulty among the four major victor powers during the International
Conference on Military Trials held at London from June 26 to August
2, 1945. 9" That Charter was the inevitably flawed culmination of an
indispensable series of compromises among those victor powers,
reconciling their considerable differences in legal system, language,
history, Second World War experiences and postwar aims, in order
to achieve the common purpose of trial and punishment of the major
Nazis. 9 6 However, the constrictive after-effects of some of those
compromises, only marginal during the actual trial, were in its
aftermath crippling a unique opportunity and attempt to infuse into
inchoate international law, by means of Anglo-Saxon common law,
an effective deterrent to war and genocide, binding alike on victors
and vanquished.
To note that the so-called London Charter was a product of
necessary compromise does not imply that the American negotiators
were duped by the Russians, as they were at Yalta.97 In fact, the idea
of an international trial of war criminals and the essential features of
that trial must rightly be labeled "made in America." '9 8 Emerging
remarkably unchanged from the heated intranational debate among the
State, War, and Justice Departments, Bernays' concepts furnished the
basis upon which the American delegation headed by Justice Jackson
and including Colonel Bernays among others, began the international
negotiations in London culminating in the London Charter signed on
August 8, 1945. 99
1 Charter of the International Military Tribunal [hereinafter London Charter], Aug.
8, 1945, Art. 7, 280 U.N.T.S. 1946-1951.
95TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 59, 73-74 (referring to the dates of the conference and
noting that the document was not signed until Aug. 8, 1945); see also REPORT, supra
note 77, at 420-28 (reprinting the text of the London Charter and the conference).
96See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 58-62 (describing some of the compromises
that had to be settled by the four powers and the problems the compromises caused).
But see TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 75 (describing the agreement as "well-organized,
coherent, and a generally sensible basis for the anticipated trial or trials.").
97 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 77 (describing Jackson's negotiations as
"generally successful").
98 Id. at 629 (stating that the London Charter embodied the principles promulgated
by the Americans).
9Id. at 75-76 (specifically contrasting the original Bernays' ideas with the outcome
of the London Charter).
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Continental and other jurists not attuned to common law,
including French and Russian prosecutors and judges at Nuremberg,
to say nothing of German defense counsel, questioned as ex postfacto
the retroactive introduction into international law of hitherto
uncodified culpability of the head of a sovereign state and its officials
for planning and committing aggression against other states, to say
nothing of crimes against their own subjects and citizens. "oFrom the
start, Justice Jackson insisted on prior agreement on procedures and
substance,'' even suggesting on several occasions that no trial at all
would be better than one in which Allied disagreements were publicly
exposed and exploited by German defense counsel.0 2 Late in the
London Conference, when the Soviet delegation had yielded or
compromised on major differences but continued to argue some
relatively minor points, Jackson threatened to turn over
American-held prisoners to the European powers for trial without
American participation. 3 Whether tired, testy, or tactile, this

100
See, AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 116 (reprinting a memorandum from
U.S. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies to the President which stated that it would be a
"torturing of the law to hold that 'Conspiracy' could be created into a 'War Crime' by
an 'ex post facto' Treaty definition."); see also REPORT, supra note 77, passim
(including innumerable instances of this legal divide between Anglo-American common
law and Continental Law).
101TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 77 (Jackson made repeated references to his proposal
for "separate national trials on an agreed substanive law basis," perhaps in an attempt
to frighten other delegates into yeilding to his proposal. Jackson's letters to Taylor
indictate Jackson's predictions that they would prevail "on matters of substance").
,0 Id. at 77. On July 18, 1945, Jackson wrote a letter to John J. McCloy in which
he stated that "an agreement for a joint trial may be impossible." Jackson repeatedly
threatened separate national trials in hope of forcing the other Allied nations to adopt
American procedure. Id.; see REPORT, supra note 77, at 102 (quoting Jackson: "I
suggest

. . .

keeping the trials on the level that would not quite so brazenly invite

accusations against us all."); id. at 407 (quoting Jackson: "[t]he difficulty in this is a
provision to regulate the order .

. .

. Otherwise I fear we open this to disorder, and we

must not forget that, of all the things these people are artists in, one of the chief things
is creating disorder."); id. at 426-27 (Article Eighteen of the Charter states, "[t]he
Tribunal shall confine the trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issue raised by
the charges.").
103See DAVIDSON, supra note 73, at 14; see also REPORT, supra note 77, at 344
(discussing the Soviet delegation's fear that an agreement would not be met).
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Critics of the ("IMT") trials further complained that it had all
the drawbacks of adversary proceedings unfamiliar to the German
defendants and defense counsel, without the mitigating safeguards of
an impartial jury. 05 The Tribunal was not bound by technical rules
of evidence, a departure most disturbing to those familiar with
Anglo-American judicial systems. 06 Furthermore, in this trial of the
vanquished, the victors not only manned the prosecution, but the
bench, court administration, and security forces. 1 7 They also had
exclusive custody of the accused, witnesses and documentary
evidence. The prosecution also predetermined the charges and rules
of procedures for of the twenty-nine delegates from the four-powers
to the London Conference: two sat on the IMT bench and four served

101
See SMITH, supra note 17, at 57. By the time Jackson was considering extreme
measures to provoke a breakdown of negotiations in order to avoid working with the
Soviets, the Soviets became interested in producing a quick agreement. "Itis probable
that the discussions at Potsdam and the committment to the September deadline prompted
instructions to the Soviet delegation in London that an agreement should be quickly
arranged." Id.
105See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 64:
The French and Russians went a long way to meet their allies'
psychological needs for the adversarial process, even though they
understood it very imperfectly; at the very last meeting Nikitchenko
had to ask: "What is meant in the English by 'cross examine?'"
Falco found "a little shocking" the idea that the defense would not,
prior to trial, be informed of "the whole case against them" and
complained: "It seems there is a possibility under this draft that the
defense could be faced during the trial with the opening of a
Pandora's box of unhappy surprises, inasmuch as during the trial
there is liberty to the prosecution to produce something new.
Id.
105
See AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 145; In a March, 1945, memorandum,
General John Weir noted that the Continental countries allow a judge to receive into
evidence anything that he feels has any probative value, a virtually unworkable practice
at Nuremberg considering the sheer volume of documents and witnesses. TAYLOR,
supra note 6, at 64.
1o7Jackson stated that the nature of the crimes was such that the prosecution and
judgment must be made by the victor nations over the vanquished foes.. Ronald
Christenson, Criminology: A Political Theory of Political Trials, 74 J. CIuM. L. 547,
572 (1983),
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as prosecutors.1 8
Der Fuhrer's Gotterdammerung bunker suicide a month
earlier notwithstanding, during May 1945, Justice Jackson wrote
President Truman:
[T]he obsolete doctrine that a head of state is immune
from legal liability . . .is a relic of the doctrine of
divine rights of kings . . . . We do not accept the

paradox that legal responsibility is the least where the
power is the greatest .

. .

. With the doctrine of

immunity of a head of state usually is coupled
another, that orders from an official superior protect
one who obeys them . .

.

. [T]he combination of

these two doctrines means nobody is responsible.l0 9
To preempt this defense, Article Seven of the London Charter
proscribed: "[t]he official position of defendants, whether as Head of
State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not
be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment. "1l0

A conspiracy trial in the absence of the chief conspirator,
especially when the Fuhrerprinzipimposed unquestioning obedience
on the indicted subordinate co-conspirators, can easily lead to such
upward buck-passing as "I was only following superior orders!"
This so-called "Nuremberg Defense" was frustrated by Article Eight
of the London Charter, ruling out superior orders as a defense, but

108 1 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 3-4 (citing the list of prosecutors at
Nuremberg); see REPORT, supra note 77, at 215 (quoting Jackson: "I hope that the
representatives here will also be the prosecutors. In fact, I would view any changes
with . ..anxiety. It would mean a long period of getting adjusted.").
19 REPORT, supra note 77, at 47. See also Henry T. King, The Limitations of
Sovereignty from Nuremberg to Sarajevo, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 167, 167-68 (1994)
(highlighting Article 8 of the London Charter which precluded the defense that one was
acting under the orders of a superior).
t1oLondon Charter, supra note 94, art. 7; see REPORT, supra note 77, at 423-24
(citing Article Seven); 1 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 12 (citing Article Seven).
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giving it consideration as mitigation in sentencing."'
If Jackson and the American delegation yielded any major
point at London, it was in the omission from the Charter of any
definition of the term "aggression," leaving it to stand naked and
weakened in IMT Count II, Crimes Against the Peace. Jackson was
fervently determined to punish aggressive war, that "crime which
comprehends all lesser crimes."" 2 During the London negotiations,
he argued that the Second World War was an illegal war of
aggression in violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and other
treaties, and was a criminal offense by common law tests at least. "3
Other Axis atrocities were all either preparatory or done in
"execution of this illegal war."' 14
Both the French and Soviet delegations flatly disagreed, the
French clinging to their centuries-old addiction to the absolute
sovereignty of raison d'etat.1 5 Soviet General Nikitchenko, noting
that neither the League of Nations nor any other international
body-despite repeated attempts, had ever been able to define
aggression, argued that "[t]he policy [of the] . . . Axis powers has
been defined as ... aggressive ...in various Allied ... and United
Nations . . . documents," 11 6 to which Jackson sourly responded:

"Why do we need a trial at all?" 17
Jackson insisted that either aggression be defined in the
Charter, thus precluding argument at the trial, or defined at the trial,
in which case it will be the subject of an argument in which the

I London Charter, supra note 94, art. 8; see also AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48,
at 215-16 (stating that, during sentencing, the Tribunal could consider a defendant's
statement that he or she was acting under the orders of a superior).
112TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 54.
"i

See, e.g., id. at 20; AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 78-79.
supra note 77, at 299.

114REPORT,

...
See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 65-66 (stating that the French clearly did not
consider it a criminal violation to launch a war of aggression).
116Id. at 65. In a revision to United States draft proposal, the Russians sought to
try all persons who participated in aggression against other nations in violation of the
principles of international law and treaties. However, the Russians only wanted this to
apply to aggressions which were carried out by the European Axis. Id.
"7 REPORT, supra note 77, at 303; see TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 66 (Jackson
publicly stated that the prime purpose of the London Charter negotiations was to
establish the criminality of aggressive war).
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Germans will participate;" 8 which, of course, is exactly what
happened." 9 Confronted by a charge of aggression without a
definition of aggression, Jackson warned, an American or British
judge would under common law grant the accused the right to show
that the war he made was not aggressive but justified or mitigated by

provocation, threats, and economic strangulation.

20

[If] we take the actual attack, actual invasion, as
constituting the aggression.

. .

we cut off arguments

that there was not an 'attack' because invasion really
was in encirclement or other remote menaces. Then
you are in the whole argument of who was doing
what to whom in Europe before 1939 .

. .

. [W]e

should not litigate the cause of the war, but hold this
2
case within the issue as to who first made an attack. ' '
Jackson acknowledged that there was more at stake for the
United States, and for him personally, than mere naive American
idealism or Puritan righteousness. 22 In 1945, Roosevelt

"I REPORT, supra note 77, at 302; TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 54 (Jackson believed
the charge of "[i]nvasion of other countries and initiation of wars of aggression in
violation of international laws or treaties" was the most important charge). Jackson
warned that if aggression was not defined, defendants would respond to the charge by
accusing the British and French of grievously injuring Germany after World War I,
through the terms of the Versailles Treaty, politically and economically. Id. at 51.
"9 At trial Wilhelm Keitel suggested that the term "War of Aggression" was useless
during the proceedings. See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 354.
120
Jackson believed it was important that causation not become an issue at trial. He
believed that the prosecution must adhere to the doctrine that planning and launching an
aggressive war was illegal, whatever the defendants' causing factors were. Such issues
as provocation and economics were important for history, but not before the Tribunal.
Id. at 51-52; see REPORT, supra note 77, at 305 (Jackson stated that he "would be
greatly surprised if they would not say that the charge of aggression could be met by any
evidence showing that the purpose was ultimately defensive to redress economic or
political disavantages.").
121See REPORT, supra note 77, at 302 (quoting Jackson, "[t]he point is that we take
the actual attack, actual invasion, as constituting the aggression .
").
"I Discussing the United States role in prosecution, Jackson stated, "[a]ny legal
position asserted on behalf of the United States will have considerable significance in the
future evolution of international law. We are put under a heavy responsibility to see that
our behavior during this unsettled period will direct the world's thought toward a firmer
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Administration officials still nursed bruises from the prewar political
pummeling they had taken from isolationists wielding the epithet
"interventionist" against them."2 3 The United States declared its
neutrality on September 1, 1939, and was still at least 124a
non-belligerent until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
However, as Roosevelt's Attorney General, Jackson had underwritten
to the American people and Congress the legality of the Lend-Lease
Program-a destroyer deal with Britain-where United States Navy
participation involved escorts for commercial voyages to protect
against German U-boats and surface raiders. 25 Jackson justified
"[a]ll aid short of war" as a legal extension of aid to nations enduring
a war of aggression illegally launched by Germany and its allies in
breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,126 to which the Axis Powers were
signatory. 27 Now, he complained, the nations so benefitted [France

enforcement of the laws of international conduct .... "). TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 5455.
12President Roosevelt received several public denunciations prior to 1945 when the
United States finally took the lead in planning and establishing the international tribunal.
Id. at 33; In late September, many Washington secrets were leaked to the press; media
stories spread across the nation criticizing the President's administration. See SMITH,
supra note 48, at 10.
'11 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 threw America into
the war, despite a strong national sentiment for "non-involvement and neutrality." See
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 43-44.
1 In 1941, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, which Jackson claimed adopted
the policy that defense of certain countries then at war, including Great Britain, was vital
to United States defense and security. Id. at 44; "The Lend-Lease program, the
exchange of bases for destroyers, and much of American policy was based squarely on
the proposition that a war of aggression is outlawed." See DAVIDSON, supra note 73, at
12.
126Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 U.N.T.S. 57
[hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; see DAVIDSON, supra note 73, at 12 (quoting
Jackson's statement that the Kellogg-Briand Pact "has started a new era in which the
criminal responsibility of statesmen who deliberately resorted to war in violations of
treaties must be made clear."); see generally TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 19-22 (noting
that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was proposed by the United States on the tenth anniversary
of its entry into World War I, signed on August 27, 1928 by fifteen nations, and
accepted by forty-four nations, including all the Great Powers with the exception of the
Soviet Union). The Pact renunciates war as an instrument of national policy). Id.
127TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 44:
Drawing on the old doctrine of just and unjust wars, Jackson flatly
rejected the view that all wars are legal and that neutrals invariably
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and the Soviet Union] were refusing
to stand up and say . . . that launching a war of
aggression is a crime and that no political or
economic situation can justify it. If that is wrong,
then we have been wrong . . . in the policy of the
United States which helped the countries under attack
28
before we entered the war.
"We are rather opening the door for trouble if there is no
definition, "129 agreed Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, seeing three options:
(1) drop the charge of aggression although it was the essence of the
complaint against the Germans; (2) risk political argument in open
court; and (3) define aggression. 130 Ultimately, all three alternatives
were adopted in a manner of speaking: the charge of aggression was
retained in the Charter,13 ' but without the clear definition Jackson
sought. There was considerable political argument during the trial
which has since served revisionist critics, and Justice Jackson did

owe a duty of impartiality as between one belligerent and another.
He declared that "aggressive wars are civil wars against the
international community" and, invoking the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
accused the Axis powers of shamefully violating their obligations
under it. Their guilt, he said, fully justified neutrals in giving aid to
the victims of aggression.
Id.
supra note 77, at 383-84. From the outset, the United States considered
Germany's actions an illegal attack on nations in need of support. id.; The French and
Russian representatives present at the London Conference were adverse to trying Nazi
leaders for launching a war of aggression; the Russians had been accused of being
aggressors themselves, during the Finnish War of 1940-41. See DAVIDSON, supra note
73, at 12-13; France objected to making the planning and launching of an aggressive
war a criminal violation because it claimed such would constitute ex post facto
legislation; France believed Nazi leaders were criminals because of the atrocities they
committed during war, not because they launched a war. Although Russia did not deny
that launching a war of aggression was a crime, it opposed offering a definition of
aggression which could be used in the future. See also TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 66.
128REPORT,

129REPORT,

supra note 77, at 303.

at 305.
"' London Charter, supra note 94, art. 6(a).
130Id.
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read his draft definitions into the records.' 3
Ironically, Jackson derived these definitions mainly from
conventions signed in London on July 3, 1933, between the Soviet
Union and several bordering European and Asian states, including
Estonia and Latvia. 13 Not only wars, but Fifth Columns, guerrilla
liberation movements, volunteer forces, foreign support of so-called
Freedom Fighters, and harboring of terrorists would have been
severely hampered-if not outlawed-had the terms of that 1933
Soviet treaty been adopted as international law in 1946 by virtue of
IMT imprimatur. 34
' But when Justice Jackson read his adaptation into
the Nuremberg record, he added an exception which, given the right
to interpretation, again made all such wars arguably just wars:
"[E]xercise of the right of legitimate self-defense, that is to say,
resistance to an act of aggression, or action to assist a state which has
been subjected to aggression, shall not constitute a war of
aggression. "1'"
Not vulnerable to the stigma of ex postfacto legislation was
the London Charter proscription of so-called conventional war
crimes. Centuries of international usage culminated in codification
in the Pre-World War I Hague' 36 and the between-the-wars Geneva
1322 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 148-49 (Jackson discussing "crimes in the

conduct of war").
...
BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH
FOR WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 255 (1975) (On July
3, 1933, in London, eight countries, including the USSR, Latvia and Estonia, signed the
Convention for the Definition of Aggression. Under this treaty, a state was considered
"aggressive" if it undertook any of the following actions before another nation did: (1)
declared war; (2) invaded with armed forces with or without a declaration of war; (3)
attacked with land, naval, or air forces with or without a declaration of war; (4) imposed
a naval blockade; or (5) provided support to armed forces who have invaded another
state. See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 44 (stating that Jackson relied on the "old doctrine
of just and unjust wars" in defining aggressive wars).
'1 See Convention for the Definition of Aggression, July 3, 1933, art. 2, 147
L.N.T.S. 69. Aggression will be found when a state is the "first to commit any of the
following acts... [including] aid to armed bands formed on the territory of a state and
invading the territory of another state; or refusal, despite demands on the part of the
state subjected to attack, to take all possible measures on its own territory to deprive the
said bands of any aid and protection." Id. (emphasis added).
3 2 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 148.
'3 The Hague Rules, Oct. 18, 1907, reprintedin ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 57, at
261-63.
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Conventions' 37 already provided sanctions, which were later
supplemented by the 1949 Geneva Convention, drawing on the
' But negotiators at London, and the
Second World War experience. 38
Nuremberg tribunals thereafter, admitted inability to cope with the
ferocity of modern technology in total war, particularly as it applied
to aerial and submarine warfare, because both sides used them so
indiscriminately during the Second World War. Nevertheless,
included in the Charter and before the Tribunal under Count III was
an indictment for "wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages,"
which was comprised of the addition of the clause, "not justified by
military necessity."' 39 Therewith, the victors of 1945 protected
themselves against counter-charges of "wanton destruction." This
leaves without sanction in international law the indiscriminate use of
aerial bombardment, either conventional or nuclear, at least in the
prosecution of a just-that is, non-aggressive-war, which is, of
course, always adjudged by the victors.
As for unrestricted submarine warfare, the IMT verdict on
Grand Admiral Karl Donitz expressly stated that his conviction was
not based on his documented violation of international rules of
submarine warfare. This was in view of similar British Orders in
1940 and Admiral Chester Nimitz's affidavit acknowledging similar
United States Navy orders for the Pacific Ocean as of December 7,

:o The Third Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, in particular, extended protection
of previous Hague and Geneva Conventions to all nationalities, not just to citizens of
signatory powers. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 57, at 327.
13 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 19-20. The 1930 London Treaty signed by eleven
nations provided that ships and submarines must conform to rules of international law.
These rules were circulated to all other nations and were accepted by 48 countries by the
beginning of World War II. Further, when the war ended in 1945, excluding the treaty
provisions relating to poison gas and submarines, the declared and generally accepted
laws of war were not fundamentally different from those embodied in the Hague and
Geneva Conventions.
"I London Charter, supra note 94, art. 6(b); reprinted in REPORT, supra note 77,
at 423-24. During the London Conference, Jackson expressed misgivings after seeing
the villages and towns of Germany. "I ... have great difficulty distinguishing between
the military necessity for that kind of destruction as distinguished from some done by the
Germans .... " Id. at 380.
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1941.14'
This leaves international law devoid of controls on
unrestricted submarine warfare in the age of the Trident missile.
To remedy concerns that many Nuremberg charges were ex
postfacto law and "victors' vengeance," on December 11, 1946, just
two months after the IMT handed down its verdicts and sentences,
the United Nations General Assembly endorsed by unanimous
resolution "the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of that
Tribunal. "141
In December 1974, the General Assembly adopted-without
a formal vote-a definition of aggression embodying the essentials
Jackson borrowed from the Soviet non-aggression treaty of 1933,
which outlawed the following: the first use of armed force regardless
of declaration of war; any military occupation, however temporary;
permitting use of territory by another State for perpetrating
aggression against a third State; or sending of armed bands, irregulars
or mercenaries. 142 The definition provided that "no political,
economic, or military considerations
would serve as justification for
3
4
1
actions."
aggressive
such
It is intriguing to note some differences of interpretation
during the General Assembly debate prior to adoption of this
resolution. The United States, United Kingdom, and Israel, among
other countries, expressed the opinion that the resolution would have
only the same recommendatory effect as any other General Assembly
resolution, providing the Security Council with general guidelines for
determining the existence of any act of aggression under the United

"41 Blue Series, supra note 22, at 31-35; 17 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 378-81
(Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, Unied States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations of
the U.S. Navy, describing how on December 7, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations
declared the Pacific Ocean a "theater of operations," ordering unrestricted submarine
warfare against Japan).
"" "[O]n December 11, 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations affirmed
the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and the judgment of the Tribunal" by adopting United Nations Resolution 95-1.
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 635. See YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 215
[hereinafter UN YEARBOOK] (Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1947).
'42 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 57, at 14-15 (reprinting the Convention for the
Definition of Aggression, supra note 134.
143id.

488

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XII

Nations Charter.' 44 The representative of Iraq, however, was of the
opinion that the resolution must be binding on all states and even the
'
Security Council. 45
Protection for the domestic minority groups against atrocities
perpetrated by their own governments does not derive from
Nuremberg, where both IMT and American tribunals rejected
prosecution attempts to establish a precedent, at least in the
In a
prosecution of a just-that is, non-aggressive-7war. 146
subsequent United States trial at Nuremberg, defendant Otto
Ohlendorf attempted to equate the Allied-asserted military necessity
of the fire-bombing of Dresden, and atomic bombing of Hiroshima,
with the extermination of Jews by his own SS Einsatzgruppe D
command. Jackson's successor, Telford Taylor, rather than attempt
to justify the fire-bombing of cities, argued: "Whatever anyone may
think about atom bombs or ordinary bombs, they have not been
dropping here in Germany since the capitulation. But will any
defendant dare to suggest . . . that the execution of the Jews in
Russia would have stopped if Russian military resistance had
147
collapsed?"
The Nazi defendants tried to justify the "Night and Fog
Order," and in some extreme instances the oral order for the "Final
Solution of the Jewish Question," on the grounds of reprisal against
"civilians by day and partisans by night."18 They maintained that
civilian populations supporting and shielding guerrilla activity against
an army in the field, or in non-combat areas against a military
occupation and government, can legally be quelled by collective
reprisals.' 49 This defense, however, was overridden by the London

t" U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
145 Id.
,46 See 1 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 253-55 (Case no. 9., United States v.
Ohlendorf et al. transcript 17:6593); 4 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, at 905-25
(National Archives Record Group 238: Collection of World War U War Crimes
Records).
147See 4 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, at 382.
148See 11 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, at 383-84 (citing the closing statement of
defense counsel for the defendant Rudolph Lehman, Chief of the Legal Department of
the German Armed Forces High Command, during United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb
et al., (Case no. 12, "High Command Case")).
149Id.
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Charter and IMT Count III proscriptions drawn from the Hague
Convention of 1907: "[M]urder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave
labor or any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, [and] killing of hostages." 5o
Still deeming this insufficient to condemn the unprecedented
deliberate Nazi atrocities against civilians, despite some Russian and
French resistance, the Americans succeeded in writing into the
London Charter under the title "Crimes Against Humanity" a
category already found in the Bernays' memorandum of September
1944, which included:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds in execution
of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated. 51
The IMT Judgment, however, ruled that the only count
specifically linked to the common plan or conspiracy in the London
Charter was "Crimes Against the Peace." Conventional war crimes
were punishable without this link, but Crimes Against Humanity were
subsidiary, being. punishable under international law only insofar as
they are also War Crimes, or because they were in execution of, or
in connection with, crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, that
is, War Crimes or Crimes Against the Peace. 5 '
Since this IMT Judgment also denied jurisdiction for Crimes
Against Humanity antedating September 1939, the American
prosecutors of the subsequent Nuremberg "Medical" and "Justice"
cases reverted to Chanler's approach in an attempt to reach those who
had carried out medical experiments on non-volunteer German
nationals, Jews, and others. They argued that Allied Control Council
Law Number 10, which established the subsequent American
1
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 57, at 263 (Hague Rules S. III, arts. 42-56, Oct. 18,
1907).
"I'London Charter, supra note 94; reprinted in REPORT, supra note 77, at 423.
'52 See 1 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 253-56.
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Nuremberg tribunals, not only implemented international law as
interpreted by the IMT, but also enactments "of the occupying
powers for the governance of and administration of justice in
Germany."153 This would include crimes of Germans against
Germans. But the defense successfully argued that occupation law
could not be applied retroactively, and in the "Ministries case" the
Tribunal reaffirmed the IMT opinion (over Judge Mallory B. Blair's
strong dissent) that crimes against German nationals antedating
September 1939 and not directly connected to Crimes Against the
Peace, however deplorable,
were not War Crimes nor punishable
54
under international law.
Protection for domestic minority groups in international law
today derives not from the Nuremberg precedent, but from the 1948
United Nations International Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide.' 55 This convention outlaws killing, causing
serious bodily injury or mental harm (the United States
implementation adds the specification "through drugs, torture, or
similar techniques" 56 ), deliberately inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about physical destruction in whole or part of a
national, ethnic, or religious group, or imposing measures to prevent
births or forcibly transferring their children, in time of peace as well
as war, whether the perpetrators are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials, or private individuals. Genocidal Acts are
not to be considered political crimes immune from extradition.
Rather, contracting parties are to enact legislation to give effect to
penalties by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which
the Act was committed, or by an international tribunal having
jurisdiction by prior agreement.' 57
153See

1 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, at 911.

12 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, passim (Case no. 11, The Ministries Case).
15 The Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 2670,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. Part I, U.N. Doc. A/810, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280, art. VI (1948)
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]; see, e.g., Brenton L. Saunders, The World's
ForgottenLesson: The Punishmentof War Criminals in the Former Yugoslavia, 8 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L. J. 357-58 (1994) (stating that the Genocide Convention allowed the
signors to apply the Nuremberg Principle of Crimes Against Humanity to the crime of
genocide during times of peace).
'5 See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 37, at 357-58.
5 Genocide Convention, supra note 155.
'5
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Both Iraqi and United States delegates voted for the Genocide
Convention,' although the United States Senate took forty years to
ratify it. However, during the debate proceedings for the adoption
of the 1974 General Assembly resolution defining aggression, there
was sharp disagreement about the interpretation of its Article Seven,
even concerning the support of internal revolts against repressive
regimes. The United States and others interpreted it as approving
only passive resistance, and not justifying armed resistance, outside
support, or intervention by a friendly nation.' 59
In Afghanistan, Soviet intervention was hoisted on its own
petard, while the United States long hesitated from intervention in
Bosnia to rescue Moslem and other endangered persons, as it has
been inhibited in Iraq to protect Kurdish and Shiite minorities in Iraq,
because it has alternately supported or disdained its own 1974
position. While condemning Cuban support of left-wing "terrorists"
,in
El Salvador, Angola, and elsewhere, the United States openly and
covertly supported Contra "freedom fighters" in Nicaragua, to say
nothing of favoring Saddam Hussein in his aggression against the
Ayatollah's Iran during the 1980's.
The International Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, as well as the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights, both unanimously adopted by United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 2200/XXI on December 16, 1966 and
in force by 1976,'" guarantee a comprehensive compendium of such
rights, providing the Security Council reaches unanimity on
enforcement in any particular case. But as the Bosian, Chechyn and
Rwandan experiences demonstrate, a clash between individual and
group rights is embedded in the identical first article of both these
Human Rights Covenants: "Part I Art. 1 (1) All peoples have the
582 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 41 (Dusan J.Djonovich ed., Series I, 1948-49)
(summarizing the voting record for all United Nations Resolutions, the editor notes that
the United States and Iraq were two of 56 nations that voted for the Genocide
Convention).
159
See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE
AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 33-35 (1987)
(asserting that the Genocide Convention is minally effective because it lacks any
enforcement mechanism).
160International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprintedin ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 57, at 356-61.
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right of self determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic,
1 61
development.
cultural
and
social
The Helsinki Final Act culminating the two-year Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on August 2, 1975,162
restricted to that continent, explicitly repeats these potentially
contradictory guarantees for individual and group rights, minorities
included, 163 by requiring "equal rights and social and cultural
development.""

But it compounds these contradictions with its

"respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty" and a pledge to
"refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or
collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the
domestic jurisdiction of another participating state. "165
All European nations-with the exceptions of Albania and
Iceland, as well as the United States and Canada-agreed explicitly
to fulfill their "obligations under international law" by signing the
CSCE Final Act. 166 Does defunct Yugoslavia's signature bind its
breakaway ethnic components, and-perhaps more to the point-does
the Helsinki Act sanction their striving for self-determination at the
expense of human and minority rights? Should it surprise anyone that
in an era which glorifies self-expression, we have reverted to
Woodrow Wilson's "self-determination of nations?"'' 67 With the
waning of great power restraints at the end of the Cold War, this
noble ideal has regrettably unleashed fanatical, fundamentalist, racial
and ethnic hatreds and bloodshed where, in a world grown small, the
masses are multiplying and mobile.

Id.

161

62 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [hereinafter CSCE], Final

Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975), 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1296 (1975),
reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 57, at 333-44.
163CSCE art. VII, supra note 162.
CSCE art. VIII, supra note 162.
I and VI, supra note 162.
11 CSCE art. X, supra note 162; see also
'61

165 CSCE, arts.

HERACLIDES, SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION 1972-1992, at 30 (1993) (Albania was

the only European nation not to join as a non-speaking observer in June 1990, and in
June 1991, as a full participant).
167See, e.g., YUGOSLAVIA'S ETHNIC NIGHTMARE: THE INSIDE STORY OF EUROPE'S
UNFOLDING ORDEAL 11, 43 (Jasminka Vdovickio & James Ridgeway eds. 1995).
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If heads-of-state, their officials and soldiers, and other
perpetrators of reciprocal atrocities in the former Yugoslavia or
Soviet Union, in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Africa,
Latin America, East Asia-to say nothing of the "First and Second
Worlds"-are to be tried for alleged crimes, current and future, it
cannot be by flawed Nuremberg precedents, but by the subsequent
endorsement and codification thereof in the United Nations Charter,
Conventions and Resolutions since 1946, to which Iraq as well as the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, among others, were parties. If the
accused are to be legally apprehended, rather than illegally
kidnapped, it must be by a "posse" authorized by the United Nations
Security Council, acting on a General Assembly indictment. If there
is to be an international trial, it should be conducted by the
International War Crimes Tribunal or another international court
specifically convened as prescribed by the United Nations Charter,
preferably seating a bench of judges from neutral states.
I think this is what this afternoon's session has to cope with.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR BUSH: Thank you, Bob. Thank you very much. We
will now hear from Mr. William Jackson.
Mr. William Jackson
MR. WILLIAM JACKSON: As we approach the fiftieth anniversary
of the trial of the principal Nazi war criminals before The
International Tribunal at Nuremberg, it is perhaps useful to look
backward at some of the formative events which constituted the
prologue to that historic proceeding.
I served as an assistant to Justice Robert H. Jackson, the
American Chief Prosecutor, commencing with the four-power
negotiations resulting in the London Agreement which created the
Tribunal and also adopted the Charter setting forth the Tribunal's
power and procedure. 68 In that capacity, I was also involved in

'6 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 647. This Charter set out the format and powers
of the International Military Tribunal. The Constitution of the Military Tribunal stated
that the London Charter, signed on August 8, 1945, was done so by representatives of
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gathering documentary evidence, interrogation of witnesses, selection
of defendants, drafting of the indictment, preparations for trial, and
the trial itself. I had only recently been admitted to the bar and
Nuremberg was my first case. The first witness I ever interrogated
was Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering, the number two Nazi after
Hitler.' 69 The trial and its preparation were an unparalleled education
for me in the cavalcade of modern European history, the ends and
means of totalitarianism, the abysses of human depravity, and the
dictates of international law regarding warfare. My father regarded
Nuremberg as the most enduring work of his life.
Before the trial could take place, the four powers had to enter
into an agreement to adopt a charter setting up the Tribunal and also
In the negotiations
to agree on the contents of an indictment.'
which occurred among the four-power representatives on these
matters, a number of differences and difficulties arose, some of
which you might find interesting to recall. Mr. Wolfe has given a
very encyclopedic summary of the negotiations and I will simply try
to highlight the portions with which I was familiar because of my
presence.
The representatives of the governments of the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the provisional government of the
French Republic joined with Justice Jackson and his staff in drafting
the Charter.' 7 ' There had never been an international criminal court.
There had been a World Court, 72 of course, but its function had been
quite different and it had no jurisdiction to try criminal charges or to

the United Kingdom, the provisional government of the French Republic, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic and the United States.
169Id. at 25.
17o London Charter, supra note 102.
1 On June 26, 1945, the International Conference on Military Trials convened for
the first of 15 sessions to draft the London Charter. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 59.
If Through the efforts of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and President Theodore
Roosevelt, the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, respectively, established the
Permanent Court of Arbitration which is still headquartered in Hague. The League of
Nations established the Permanent Court of International Justice which was in existence
from January 1922 to April 1946, and Article Seven of the United Nations Charter
established the International Court of Justice. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT:
WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 6-21 (1995).
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punish individual offenders.173 The representatives of the four powers
met at Church House in London on June 26 and commenced their
negotiations. 1 4 It was assumed from the outset that the Tribunal
should be a four-power tribunal and that it should be patterned
roughly after military courts. 175
There were the usual barriers of language. There was also
the difficult problem of first understanding and then reconciling
different legal concepts. 176 There was no Esperanto for legal
discussion. For example, while the representatives of all four powers
agreed substantially that a war of aggression is a Crime Against
Peace and, therefore, a War Crime, the French were puzzled by the
concept of a common plan or conspiracy, which was well-known in
Anglo-American law. 177 After considerable, extended discussion, the
French adopted the concept and it was included in the Charter. 78
At the outset, Justice Jackson made it plain that the United
States did not intend that its criminal procedures should be adopted
by the Tribunal; that, in fact, it was not entirely appropriate in the

trial of major war criminals, and that it was unwise to negotiate with

See, e.g., id. at 8-17 (noting that previous organizations only had the authority
to arbitrate regarding disputes at sea as well as the interpetation of treaties and rendering
advisory opinions about different matters in disputes such as the proposed custom union
between Austria and Germany).
"4 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 50.
"I See TAYLOR supra note 6, at 60. Although there was some talk of having
separate trials conducted by each of the four powers, each power trying the prisoners in
its custody, negotiations led to one trial. Id.
176The Anglo-American adversarial system, where each side knows only a limited
amount about the other side's case, differs from the Continental inquisitorial system in
which the entire case is known before the trial. While the French and Russians were
confused by the concept of cross-examining and the possibility of surprises which could
confront the prosecution ina system where not all is known before trial, Justice Jackson
was at a loss when it came to the thought of all the evidence being presented before trial
because he "would not see anything left for trial and, for ... [himlself, [he] would not
know what to do in open court." TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 63-64.
173

"

See id. at 66.

See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 58-59. Conspiracy, however, was not listed
as a separate offense, but included in three prosecutable offenses: "Crimes Against
Peace," "War Crimes" and "Crimes Against Humanity," with most of the American
meaning of conspiracy included in the first offense. Id.
178
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any particular country's procedure as the ultimate objective.179 The
goal was a procedure or combination of procedures, whatever the
source, that the entire world would recognize as both appropriate and
fair.'
Out of these negotiations came the London Agreement and
Charter of August 8, 1945.18" The Agreement provided, in essence,

for the adoption of the Charter by the four powers.
The Charter established an international military tribunal with
one judge and one alternate judge from each of the four powers. 82
It fixed the place of the first trial at Nuremberg.' 83 It established
certain general procedures under which the Tribunal would operate
81 4
and defined the offenses over which it would have jurisdiction.
Most significant of these was the declaration that the planning of a
war of aggression was a crime for which there should be individual
responsibility on the part of those participating.' 5
The principle of individual accountability rather than state
accountability was deliberately adopted, as was the provision ruling
out a defense of superior orders, although a plea of superior orders
was permitted to be considered by the Tribunal in mitigation, if it so
chose.' 86 The declaration that aggressive war is a crime, as you
heard from Mr. Wolfe, was based on a variety of legal sources,

179Id. at 49; PERSICO, supra note 23, at 48. This was, for the most part, done so

as not to alienate the French and Russians, by making them feel inferior to the AngloAmerican methodology; in the long run, this led to feelings of compromise. Id.
l80 See, e.g., PERSICO, supra note 23, at 32 (stating that the delegates sought to
create a charter that contained procedures and crime descriptions with which everyone
would agree).
18, London Charter, supra note 94; SMITH, supra note 17, at 57-58.
,s London Charter, supra note 94, at art. 2; SMITH, supra note 17, at 57; PERSICO,
supra note 23, at 34.
'" See, e.g., PERISCO, supra note 23, at 47.
184 See, e.g., Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled
Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 833, 847 (1990) ("The parties finally agreed upon a
compromise plan, which embraced the Anglo-American concept of trial procedure, but
was modified to include some characteristics of the continental system.").
" See, e.g., id. at 847-48 (stating that the official position of a defendant will not
safeguard him from punishment, nor will the excuse that he was merely following
orders); id. at 842 (declaring that Nuremberg was "significant" for the fact that "no
tenet of international law proposed to hold individual members of the warring state
criminally liable.").
'86Id.

at 847.
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including treaties outlawing resort to war as an instrument of national
policy. These included not only the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928,187
of which Germany was a signatory, but the so-called Litvinov Treaty
of 19338 of which the USSR was one of the principal parties. In
this sense, the charter was a codification of existing law which is
emphasized by the subsequent adherence to the Charter by other
89
nations. 1
One of the sticking points in the negotiations over the Charter
was the Soviet attempt to write a bill of attainder limited to the
purpose of getting rid of Nazis."19 The Soviet negotiator insisted that
aggression should be defined as a crime when committed in the past
by the Nazis but that a general and more inclusive definition should
be avoided.' 9 '
Justice Jackson, on the other hand, stated
unequivocally that unless the Charter contained a general statement
on the criminality of aggression, the United States would not
participate in any international trial, but would proceed alone. 92
Because of the Americans' exclusive possession of the twin
essentials to a trial, the leading prisoners and the bulk of captured
documents, the Americans were in the position to hold a trial without
the aid of any other nation, while the others were dependent on
187See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 20 (discussing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note

126.
'" The Litvinov Treaty was drafted at the "Convention Defining Aggression,
between Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and the
U.S.S.R. on July 3, 1933." Jackson, supra note 35, at 555.
"' See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (detailing the existing law on
which the Charter was premised); see, e.g., Fogelson, supra note 184, at 870 (stating
that "several of the principles contained in the Nuremberg Charter were also built into
the United Nations Charter," thereby providing an example of how other nations
subsequently followed the Charter).
"9See, e.g., Fogelson, supra note 184, at 847 (positing that "[tihe representatives
were also confronted with the Soviet Union's desire to limit the crimes charged to only
those acts committed by the European Axis.").
9' See generally id. (stating the Soviet Union's position-of restricting the crimes to
those committed in the past by the Axis powers in order to avoid indictment for similar
crimes under a more expansive definition).
'" See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 66 (noting that "Jackson had declared it to
be the prime purpose of the trial to establish the criminality of aggressive war under
general international law."); id. at 67 (expressing Jackson's feelings that something
worse than failing to reach an agreement would be to reach one "that would stultify the
position which the United States has taken throughout").
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American assistance.' 93 Realization of the strength of the American
bargaining position led the Soviets to abandon their particularized
definition of aggression and to live up to the principles they had
professed in the Litvinov Treaty of 1933.194
Another obstacle, as we have heard from Mr. Wolfe, was the
problem of defining aggression. Justice Jackson argued determinedly
that it is not enough merely to condemn aggression in general terms
but that the Charter, if it was not to incorporate a possibly basic
defect, should clearly define what it meant by aggression. The
purpose, partly, was to rule out as grounds for defense a resort to
pretext, evasions, likelihood, and such other estimates of a potential
enemy's intention as exists in the eye of the beholder. It was also to
avoid diversionary arguments as to deep-rooted grievances and other
excuses for war and to concentrate on the sole material issue, which
was responsibility for starting the war. Nevertheless, the British,
French and Soviet representatives refused to accept the Jackson
definition or, in fact, any definition of aggression. Fortunately,
doubt of what constitutes aggression never arose in the Nuremberg
proceedings because the evidence showed the Nazi attacks to have
95
been deliberate and unjustified aggression under any possible test. 1
I turn now to the indictment. On October 18, 1945, at the
first public session of the IMT held in Berlin, the four prosecutors
presented an indictment in four counts charging the twenty-three
defendants and seven organizations' 96 with Conspiracy to Wage
Aggressive War, Breaches of International Peace, violations of the
rules of warfare, and Crimes Against Humanity. 197

193"Of the twenty-two defendants brought to Nuremberg for the first trial, ten...
were prisoners of the United States . . . The Americans had a large staff on the
continent which was bringing in the bulk of the documentary evidence [and so] the
United States was in a far better position than any of the other countries to conduct a
major war crimes trial on its own." TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 62-63.
1' See Igor Grazin, The InternationalRecognition of National Rights: The Baltic
States Case, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1385, 1403 (1991) (stating that under the
Litvinov Treaty "the act of aggression can 'never' be legitimate").
,95Jackson, supra note 35, at 555.
196 See generally JOHN MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT: THE USE OF SEIZED

10-12 (1988) (listing the
various indictments).
'97 See SMITH, supra note 17, 13-18 (explaining the particulars of the four counts).
RECORDS IN THE UNITED STATES PROCEEDINGS AT NURNBERG,
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The negotiations among the four prosecutors with respect to
the contents of the indictment were also fraught with numerous
controversies, most of which involved the Soviet representatives.
One example of such differences is of some modern significance. In
handing up the indictment to the Tribunal, Justice Jackson
accompanied it with a letter of reservation, which stated as follows:
In the indictment of German War criminals signed
today, reference is made to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and certain other territories as being within the area
of the USSR. This language is proposed by Russia
and is accepted to avoid the delay which would be
occasioned by insistence on an alteration in the text.
The indictment is signed subject to this reservation
and understanding. I have no authority either to
admit or to challenge on behalf of the United States,
Soviet claims to sovereignty over such territories.
Nothing, therefore, in this indictment is to be
construed as a recognition by the United States of
such sovereignty or as indicating any attitude either
on the part of the United States or on the part of the
undersigned toward any claim to recognition of such
sovereignty. 19
In addition, Count Three of the indictment, dealing with War
Crimes and specifically the murder and ill treatment of prisoners of
war, made reference to the Katyn forest massacre of Polish officers

198

[Jackson] was troubled by the description, in Count Three, of the

Soviet Union as including the erstwhile Baltic nations (Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania), the Soviet incorporation of which in 1939 had
never been officially recognized by either the United Kingdom of the
United States. Jackson did not insist that the Indictment's language
be changed, but presented . . . letters stating that nothing in the
Indictment was to be construed as American recognition of the
annexations in question.
See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 118.
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who were prisoners of war. 99 The Soviets had insisted that this
charge be made against the German High Command. However,
Justice Jackson and his staff had information and some evidence from
Mr. McCloy of the War Department and Messrs. Donovan and
Dulles of the Office of Strategic Services, that the massacre, which
indeed occurred, was actually carried out by the Soviets while they
were in possession of the territory and not by the Germans. 2°° Justice
Jackson, therefore; resisted the Soviet position and once again
threatened to go it alone if the accusation was included against the
German High Command.2° '
After much negotiation, a compromise was finally reached.
First, the language of the charge was couched in the passive voice:
"In September 1941, 11,000 Polish officers, who were prisoners of
war, were killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk."202 Secondly,
Justice Jackson insisted that the United States would take no part in
the proof of this charge, which would be the entire and sole
responsibility of the Soviet prosecution. 0 3 To this they agreed and
a few years ago, as we know, a successor government of the USSR
publicly acknowledged that USSR forces had carried out the Katyn
Forest massacre. 2°
Now, a few words about the trial. You will hear from other
members of the panel about various aspects of the trial. There is one
aspect I should like to mention. The total time elapsed from

199PERSICO, supra note 6, at 358-59. Following Poland's defeat, nearly 11,000
Polish soldiers disappeared. A German regiment happened upon the unmarked graves
of a portion of these men in the Katyn forest, and the issue became whether the Germans
had killed the soldiers, or whether the Russians had done so when they occupied the
forest in 1940. A brief investigation seemed to support the Germans' position, and the
IMT dismissed the allegation for lack of sufficient evidence. Id.
200 See generally DAVIDSON, supra note 73, at 71-72 (discussing the German,
American and British investigations of the Katyn Forest massacre).
201Id. at 639.
202 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 117 (quoting the indictment).
203 The prosecutors at Nuremberg told Russian prosecutor Rudenko that "he must

assume full responsibility for supporting the accusation." Id.
2
1 See generally Roger Boyes, Yeltsin Snubs Katyn Massacre Ceremony, THE TIMES
(London), June 6, 1995 (explaining how the Soviet Union denied carrying out the Katyn
forest massacre and blamed the Germans until 1990, when Moscow admitted guilt. Two
years later, after Polish pressure, Mr. Yeltsin opened KGB files on the fate of the
22,000 arrested).
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President Truman's executive order from May 2, 1945, appointing
Justice Jackson as American representative and Chief Prosecutor to
the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal of October 1, 1946, was
approximately seventeen months. The agreement of London,
including the Charter, was signed after six weeks of arduous
negotiations on August 8, 1945 .205 A little more than two months
later, on October 18, the four-power indictment consisting of over
100 pages, including specific allegations with respect to each
defendant, was submitted and served. Approximately one month later
on November 20, 1945, the trial commenced. During the pretrial
period, the prosecution staff had studied thousands of documents or
translations, had interrogated a vast number of potential witnesses,
and the American First Army had completed the restoration of the
courtroom, offices and prisons at the Nuremberg Palace of Justice.2 °6
The trial continued from November 20, 1945, with the participation
of four chief prosecutors, twenty-three individual defendants and
seven organizations and their counsel with every word of testimony
and argument and every document translated into four languages until
the evidence and arguments of both sides had been submitted in late
summer 1946.207

On October 1, 1946, after several months of

deliberation, the Tribunal delivered its judgment.20 8 The speed of the
supra note 23, at 47.
Taylor described the setting for the Trial:
The Palace of Justice was . . . a large, heavily constructed complex,
including a jail, an office building, and a courthouse, which had been
the seat of the Court of Appeals for the Nuremberg region. [On
October 12, 1945], the principal courtroom was still under repair
and enlargement to accommodate an audience of several hundred.
Taylor, supra note 6, at 129.
207
See 1 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 3-7; see also AMERICAN ROAD, supra note
48, at 207 (stating that the four languages into which the documents were translated
were Russian, English, French and German); see also PERSICO supra note 23, at 374,
379 (stating that over 4000 documents were entered into evidence).
2I8 The reading of the judgments took two days, beginning on September 30 and
205See, e.g., PERSICO,
2

ending on October 1, 1946.
took the morning and
[The] description of the rise of Nazism .
part of the afternoon of September 30; the charges against the
organizations took the rest of that afternoon; the decisions on the
guilt or innocence of the individual defendants took the morning of
October 1; [and] the penalties to be inflicted on the guilty defendants
were announced that afternoon.
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proceedings was monumental, particularly when compared with such
long running epics as the Iran-Contra investigations and trials,
numerous antitrust cases and the current performance in Los
Angeles,209 nor was this result achieved at the expense of fairness.
Due process of law was observed faithfully. The defendants' counsel
were given access to prosecution documents. 20 They were permitted
to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and they were given
assistance in securing the attendance of witnesses for their clients.211
It is interesting that more time was consumed by the defense
case than by the prosecution case. 212 The judgment of the Tribunal
itself reflected the fairness of the proceedings. As you have heard,
three defendants were acquitted outright and while many were
sentenced to death, the others were sentenced to imprisonment

varying from ten years to life in accordance with the evidence of their
culpability.213

I have just a few afterthoughts. The London agreement to
which the Charter was annexed, was adhered to by nearly two dozen
nations and its principles, as well as the judgment of the Tribunal,
and had been affirmed by a resolution of the General Assembly of the

United Nations.21 "
The basic principles condemning wars of
aggression, slaughter of captives and civilians, and crimes against

TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 574.
209 See, e.g., K. Lahm Gunther, German Law Student Sees Money, Juries as Too

Powerful in U.S., THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 1996, at 9A ("Running for nine
months, the Simpson trial became one of the longest criminal trials in U.S. history.
Even the initial Nuremberg war-crimes trial didn't last that long.").
210 London Charter, supra note 94, at Art. 16 (a) (stating that "[t]he indictment shall
include full particulars (including) a copy of the Indictment and of all the documents...
translated into a language which he understands, shall be furnished to the Defendant at
a reasonable time before the Trial.").
2.. Id. at Art. 16 (e) (stating that a "defendant shall have the right . . . to
cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution."); see also id. at Art. 17 (a) ("The
Tribunal shall have the power to summon witnesses to the Trial and to require their
attendance and testimony and to put questions to them.").
21 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 165 (stating that the trial opened on
November 20, 1945); PERISCO, supra note 23, at 261, 267, 374 (stating that the
prosecution rested its case on March 6, 1946 and that the Defense case opened March
8, 1946 and rested August 31, 1946).
23 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 305.
214

See, e.g.,

TAYLOR,

supra note 6, at 635.
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humanity remain as a part of international criminal law.2" 5 What has
been missing for the last fifty years has been a policeman and a court
to enforce the law.
In an article in the 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs which was
referred to earlier,2 6 I proposed an answer to Lord Carson's classic
taunt. He said, "When I'm confronted with my pacifist friends with
these treaties for the preservation of peace, I always ask them,
'Where's your sheriff?' 217 My proposal, which I espoused, (I did
not, obviously, originate it), was for the creation, through the United
Nations, of a permanent international court of criminal justice to
apply the Nuremberg Law in any case of future war crimes or crimes
aganinst peace, by enlarging the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice. 218 The only international criminal court thus far
established is the recent United Nations Tribunal for crimes in former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 2' 9 But aggressive war is not within the
Tribunal's jurisdiction.
It remains to be seen, perhaps after more convulsions and
conflicts, whether a permanent international court will be created to
apply the Nuremberg Law so that, in the words of Mr. Churchill,
"An indelible warning may be given to future ages and that
successive generations of men may say 'so perish all who do the like
again."' Thank you.
PROFESSOR BUSH: Thank you very much, Mr. William Jackson.
We will now hear from Professor Bernard Meltzer.

215Id.

at 637.

216Jackson,
217Id.

supra note 35.

at 558-89.

28 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 641 ("In the United Nations General

Assembly, there is increasing support for the establishment of a permanent tribunal for

the trial of international crimes.").
29 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/827
(1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3543d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/955
(1994).
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Professor Bernard Meltzer
PROFESSOR BERNARD MELTZER: I have been asked to say
something about my work and impression at Nuremberg, a very
risky invitation to anecdotage. I may be able to say something about
the larger issues that have been raised and that are summarized in the
slogan "victor's justice. "220
I arrived in Nuremberg in September of 1945. That city, like
much of Germany, was a heap of rubble. The choice of the
Nuremberg Palace of Justice as the situs of the trial, whatever the
reasons behind it, certainly meshed with a justice of retribution. The
City of Nuremberg had been linked with the notorious aspects of the
Nazi regime. 221
The Nuremberg laws of 1935 had been part of a series of
anti-Semitic measures that had stripped German Jews of their
citizenship and their property and had excluded them from the
government, the armed forces, and other important areas of economic
and cultural life. 222 Furthermore, like other members of my
generation, I had seen newsreels of Nazi party rallies in Nuremberg,
during which Hitler had sought to seduce, deceive, and terrorize his
neighbors. Unlike most of Nuremberg, the Palace of Justice had
remained substantially intact, as had the prisons next to it. Alfred
Speer, a convicted defendant, remarks in his diary-somewhat
mystically-that he could not help thinking that there had been a
deeper meaning in the almost miraculous survival of the Palace of
Justice.22 3
Initially, my own work in Nuremberg dealt primarily with a

220See, e.g., James Crawford, CurrentDevelopments: The ILC's Draft Statutefor
an International Criminal Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 140, 141 (1994). The slogan

"a victor's justice" is commonly used by critics to describe the imposition of the victor
nation's laws on a vanquished foe. Id.
221See, e.g., TAYLOR supra note 6, at 61 (stating that Nuremberg was where the
Nazi party staged its annual mass demonstrations and where the anti-Semitic
"Nuremberg Laws" had been decreed in 1935); THE BLACK BOOK, supra note 3, at 9193 (discussing the creation of the so-called Nuremberg Laws).
222See generally THE BLACK BOOK; supra note 3, at 80-110 (discussing all antiSemitic laws passed in Germany between 1933 and 1943); id. at 470-519 (reprinting the
actual Nazi legislation and English translations).
223 See ALFRED SPEER, SPANDAU: THE SECRET DIARIES

52 (1976).
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so-called economic case.224 Incidentally, that assignment had nothing
to do with the law and economics program at the University of
Chicago. Frank Shea, who had been an assistant attorney general
when Jackson had been Attorney General, recruited me for
Nuremberg and was quite interested in the Economic Case.225 Shea
viewed it as important in connection with the general charge under
Count One-that is, Conspiracy to Commit Aggression.226 The key
financiers and industrialists, as he saw it, were culpable under that
count because they had made German rearmament possible, with
knowledge that Hitler intended to use his military machine for
aggression against his neighbors. 2 7
The Economic Case also covered violations of the established
laws of war, as well as offenses that had been newly specified in the
Charter-that is to say, Crimes Against Humanity.22 8 Crimes Against
Humanity overlapped with traditional war crimes and, in the end, the
Tribunal essentially folded Crimes Against Humanity into traditional

224 See generally WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, AND WAR CRIMES TRIALS 471
(Norman E. Tutorow, ed, 1986) [hereinafter WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS]. After
the International Military Tribunal's initial trial, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal had
12 subsequent trials. Cases 5, 6, and 10, against Flick, Farber, and Krupp, respectively,
were referred to as the Economic Cases; see also TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 80-82
(stating that the Economic Case was conceptualized by Shea after Jackson asked Shea
to handle the "economic aspects of the case").
225 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 80-81.
226 See id. at 81. Shea thought that the Eonomic Case was an important component
in the charge of conspiracy to launch an aggressive war because it was the action of the
industrialists and financiers that allowed Germany to rearm itself. Id.
2.7
Id. at 81 "The guilt of the industrialists and financers, as Shea saw it, was that
they had given Hitler the material means to rearm Germany, with full knowledge that
Hitler planned to use these armaments to carry out his program of German
aggrandizement by military conquest." Id. Proving this conspiracy turned on finding
evidence of the financiers who had sufficient knowledge of Hitler's plans. "While
rearmament involved violations of the Treaty of Versailles, it was not otherwise
intrinsically unlawful." Id.
2 London Charter, supra note 94, at sec. 2, art. 6. The crimes coming within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there was individual responsibility were Crimes
Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity. The Charter states that
"[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices' participation in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan." Id.
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war crimes.229 When I mention traditional war crimes, I am referring
to the violations of the rules embodied in the Geneva Convention.23°
Thus, the Economic Case covered the plundering and pillaging of the
occupied territories that was systematically organized on a vast scale,
at the highest level of responsibility. In addition, the Economic Case
covered the deportation and exploitation of millions of slave laborers,
again, under a program that had been officially planned and carried
23
out. 1

One of my jobs was to coordinate the work of a group of
lawyers who organized the evidence and who wrote trial briefs
indicating what we were going to prove and how we were going to
prove it. Some of those briefs related to systematic pillaging and
plundering of territories occupied by Germany in the east. After the
responsibility for those offenses in these areas had been allocated to
the Soviets, we handed them our briefs and our supporting
documents. Disclosure was, however, a one-way street. For
example, our group often asked the Soviets for a document that we
thought they had probably captured. We never got a reply, let alone
a document.
The Soviets disinclination to share documents reminds me of
a story about Justice Jackson, which I heard second- or third-hand,
and now that Bill is here I would like him to check. At a birthday
party in Nuremberg for the Justice, he was given a Swiss watch
bought from our somewhat meager PX's inventory. Now, at that
time, the Russian GI, or the Soviet GI, was just captivated by
watches with a Mickey Mouse face. The Justice looked at his watch
and he said "It is a lovely watch. Where did it come from?" A wag
answered that it came from the Soviets. And the Justice quickly
replied, "That's fine. That's really fine. Up to now, I haven't been
able to get even the time of day from them." Is that right?
229 See,

e.g., Matthew Lippman, Towards an International Criminal Court, 3 SAN

DIEGO JUSTICE J. 1, 59-60 (1995). It appears that the IMT interpreted Crimes Against
Humanity to be both coextensive with, as well as distinct, from traditional war crimes.
Since the crimes were committed in connection with an act of aggressive war, the
offenses were characterized as Crimes Against Humanity. Id.
230 See, e.g., AMERICAN ROAD, supra note 48, at 23 n.4 (stating that the Geneva
Convention designated protections for the rights of prisoners of war and was signed July
27, 1929).
11 See supra notes 310-17, and accompanying text.

1995]

PANEL I

507

MR. JACKSON: Correct.
PROFESSOR MELTZER: Well, now I guess we should get back to
business.
I was, as you have been told, also responsible for preparing
and presenting to the Tribunal the evidence of the case against
Funk. 3 ' He had been charged with Crimes Against the Peace, War
Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity.233 Funk joined the Nazi
Party in 1931 and, as the Tribunal found, despite his denial, had soon
become one of Hitler's personal economic advisors.234 In March of
1933, he became Under Secretary of the newly established Ministry
of Propaganda headed by Joseph Goebbels,235 who remained faithful

to Hitler until they both committed suicide.
As a propagandist, Funk had a role in stimulating the
He became more
persecution of Jews and other minorities.
prominent early in 1938 when he succeeded Schacht as Minister of
Economics and as the Pleni Potentiary General for the War Economy.
In January of 1939, Funk had also succeeded Schacht as head of the
Reichsbank.2 36 As Minister of Economics, Funk played an important

232 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 264 (stating that Walther Funk's case was

dealt with by American junior counsel Bernard Meltzer, a naval lieutenant).
233 Funk was charged under all four counts: Count One, The Common Plan or
Conspiracy; Count Two, Crimes Against Peace; Count Three, War Crimes; and Count
Four, Crimes Against Humanity. Funk was acquitted under Count One and found guilty
under Counts Two, Three and Four. WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 225,
at 463-65.
234 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 86 (stating that Funk was the successor to
Hjalmar H.G. Schacht as the head of the Reichsbank and the Minister of Economics);
see also SMITH, supra note 17, at 204-06 (noting that Funk had joined the Nazi Party
in the early 1930's and was nearly always present at the conferences on the expansion
of Germany's armaments, was active in making economic preparations for the attack on
Poland, and was active in organizing and executing the economic exploitation of the
conquered territories).
23 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 382 (describing the relationship between
Joseph Goebbels and Funk while they worked together at the Propaganda ministry).
236 Funk became Minister of Economics in November 1937. Less than a year later,
he was appointed as President of the Reichsbank. Funk held these positions until the end
of the war. Both times he replaced Schacht, who had fallen into disgrace with Hitler.
Id. at 392-93.
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role in the elimination of Jews from the German economy.237 In his
he wept while admitting
interrogation,
pretrial
his guilt, I will quote him, "in the Jewish affair." 3 ' He added that
he should have resigned in 1938. But, in fact, he had held three
positions important for war finance and war production throughout
the war.2 39

In dealing with the charges against Funk, the Tribunal may
have been affected by Funk's personal situation at the time of the
trial. He was by then in poor health. 240 He wept frequently, as
evidence of Nazi horrors was introduced.241 He was a wholly
unimpressive and unthreatening figure. His weakness as a person
may have served him well as a defendant.242
In any event, the Tribunal noted that he had been subject to
the supervision of Goering.243 The Tribunal found Funk not guilty
under Count One, the count alleging participation in the common plan
to commit Crimes Against the Peace, but did find him guilty under
Count Two, which charged him with planning, preparing, and
initiating specific wars of aggression. 244 The Tribunal's acquittal of
Funk under Count One, understandably, has been widely criticized. 45
Funk was also found guilty of crimes under Count Three (War
Crimes), and Count Four (Crimes Against Humanity). 246 The
237See, e.g., id. at 393-94 (stating that Funk participated in a meeting in which the

decision was made to exclude the Jews from economic life).
238See, e.g., id. at 187; DAVIDSON, supra note 73, at 251.
239 See DAVIDSON, supra note 73, at 248-49 (stating that Funk was President of the
Reichsbank, the German State Bank, Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy, and
the Minister of Economics).
240See, e.g., id. at 247 (stating that as early as World War I, Funk was discharged
from the army because of ill health).
241See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 395-96.
242See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 591 ("Funk's deliverance from the hangman
can only be explained by his cringing personality, suggesting that he was wholly
incapable of doing physical harm."). Id.
243See SMITH, supra note 17, at 204 (noting that as Minister of Economics, Funk
was directly under Goering's control).
244See WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 225, at 465.
245See SMITH, supra note 17, at 206 (discussing the surprise resulting from Funk's
acquittal on Count One since he participated in the plans to finance the war and helped
develop plans for exploiting the Soviet Union).
246 id.; see also WAR CRIMES,WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 225, at 465.
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Tribunal noted that the bank where Funk had been chief, pursuant to
an agreement with Himmler, 47 had received gold teeth, spectacles,
gold eyeglass frames, jewelry, and other valuables that had been
stripped from concentration camp victims. z4 Funk had, as I recall,
also wept when he had been confronted with this evidence prior to
trial. He had protested that he had not known that the Reichsbank
had been engaged in that traffic, 24 9 but Tom Dodd's effective
cross-examination demolished that claim.25° The Tribunal concluded
that Funk had the guilty knowledge, or had deliberately closed his
" '
eyes to the ghoulish traffic. 25
In connection with Counts Three and Four, the Tribunal also
relied on Funk's involvement in the deportation of forced labor, as
well as the exploitation of labor and the inmates of concentration
camps.252 The Tribunal observed, however, that Funk had not been
particularly interested in these programs, again noting that Funk had
never been a dominant figure.253 And finding mitigation in that fact,
the Tribunal sentenced him to life imprisonment, but he was
released
25 4
commuted.
been
having
sentence
his
a few years later,

247See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 371 (stating that in 1936 Hilter gave Himmler full

control over all police and civil security matters); see also SMITH, supra note 17, at 19697 (stating that Frick tried to keep Himmler as a subordinate official, but Himmler soon
acquired too much power to remain under Frick's control).
241 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 395-96.
249 Id. at 395.
0 See id. at 395-96. Thomas Dodd, part of the American prosecution team,
succeeded Storey as Executive Counsel and was in charge of the American prosecutorial
staff in Jackson's absence. Id. at 381.
211 See SMITH, supra note 17, at 205-06.
25 Id.; see also TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 429 (stating that Kehrel, while sitting in
for Funk, discussed "labor supply" with Saucket at a meeting of the Central Planning
Board).
25 See. e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 204-06 (discussing Funk's level of
involvement in the criminal enterprise).
I Funk's life was eventually spared by the Tribunal because of his lack of
involvement with the organization and planning of aggressive Nazi war tactics. The
Tribunal did, however, determine that Funk's economic participation in certain
aggressive wars was sufficient to warrant life imprisonment. The last sentence of the
Tribunal's opinion took note of Funk's detachment from his co-defendants by stating that
Funk was "never a dominant figure in the various programs in which he participated."
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 590.
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I want to turn now to defendant Schacht, 55 a much
more formidable figure, who had been Funk's predecessor as
Minister of Economics and related offices. Through his financial
measures, Schacht played a central role in the rearmament of
Germany in the 1930's.256 He had been a prime target of the
Economic Case, having been indicted under Counts One and Two.257
During the trial Schacht was self-confident, unbending, and almost
self-righteous in his denial of guilt. Eventually he was acquitted of
all the charges against him. 58 Schacht's case was a difficult one. In
1936, relying on financial arguments, he urged Hitler to retrench on
the program of rearmament. 59 By 1938, he resigned, or had been
dismissed, from all of his nonceremonial offices.2 60 By the end of the
war, he himself was in a concentration camp because of suspicions
of his complicity in the bomb-plot against Hitler26 ' and also,

11 Hjalmar Schacht was the pre-war head of the Reischbank and Minister of
Economics. He was not a member of the Nazi party, but rather was a patrician
financier. Although he held on to the title of Minister without portfolio until 1943, he
was not prominent in Hitler's regime after 1939, and passed out of public life, except
for an occasional ceremonial appearance. SMITH, supra note 17, at 11.
. There was a question as to whether or not charges should have been brought
against Schacht because Schacht had distanced himself from Hitler as Hitler's plan
progressed. The biggest question was whether Schacht knew, because of his position on
the economic staff, of Hitler's plan to wage an aggressive war. TAYLOR, supra note 6,
at 86.
17 Schacht was included in the indictment more in terms of his part in the economic
team, rather than any singular act on his part alone, due to the Americans' plan to
prosecute organizations. SMITH, supra note 17, at 63-64.
258 Schacht insisted that because he had tried to thwart an aggressive war, and
because he worked for the resistance, he was not guilty of the charges brought against
him. Id. at 271-82.
259 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 384. But see SMITH, supra note 17, at 27576 (stating that despite Schacht's claim of opposing Hitler at this time, his failure to
withdraw gave the appearance that Schacht was a participant in planning an aggressive
war).
260 Although Schacht resigned in February 1937, at Hitler's request, he did not make
his resignation public until February 1938, which is when Funk's appointment as
Minister of Economics was announced. Schacht stayed on as Reichminister, a
figurehead position, until 1943. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 384.
261 Schacht was not, in fact, part of the assassination attempt, but was arrested and
spent the rest of the war in a series of concentration camps. The fact that a man was
released from a concentration camp by the Americans proved to make his conviction for
war crimes difficult. PERSICO, supra note 23, at 333-34.
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apparently, because of Hitler's animus against Schacht because of
Schacht's attitude before the outbreak of the war.2 62 Compared to
others in the dock, Schacht seemed almost benign, more a victim than
a villain of the totalitarian structure of authoritarianism that he had
helped build.263 The Tribunal concluded that the case against him
turned on whether he had known of the Nazi aggressive plans, but the
Tribunal also concluded that proof of such knowledge beyond a
The Soviet judge dissented
reasonable doubt was lacking. 2'
agreed.265
and
some
American
commentators
vigorously,
I have a footnote about an ephemeral connection that I had
with the Schacht case which may be of interest to students of
bureaucracy. At one stage, I thought that I was assigned the job of
presenting the case against Schacht, as well as the case against Funk,
a logical combination, even though Schacht had been the much bigger
fish. However, I had serious doubts that our evidence was strong
enough to convict Schacht. I advised my superiors of my doubts,
along with information that I had been receiving from the States, that
Schacht was going to be acquitted because of his connection with
international bankers.266 Now, I later dismissed that reasoning, but
I was concerned about some institutional issues. I was the most
junior officer on the prosecution staff, and I was concerned that if
Schacht was acquitted, the Prosecution would be accused of sending
a boy to do a man's job. I reported those concerns while
emphasizing that I really personally wanted to present the case against
Schacht.
262Schacht's imprisonment at Dachau, although not welcomed by Schacht, possibly

saved him from conviction and a death sentence. Id. at 439.
263The emphasis on Schacht's pre-war activities, in terms of conspiracy charges,
heralded his acquittal because it could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he
had known of Hitler's plans. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 385.
2 Id. at 277 (stating that Schacht helped the Resistance). In arguing for Schacht's
acquittal, John Parker, a judge from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals who was an
alternate judge with no formal voting rights, commented "Herr Schacht was a banker
and therefore a man of character." PERSICO, supra note 23, at 390.
265 Biddle at first was more inclined to convict on Count Two, but later reversed his
position and decided to convict on Count One. SMITH, supra note 17, at 277-79.
266 The Soviets always believed that the Westerners would never convict Schacht
because he was a capitalist. In the end, Schacht's acquittal gave the Court what they had
sought from the beginning: the appearance of a just and fair court. PERSIco, supra note
23, at 401-02.
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I was relieved without any further explanation and the case
against Schacht was presented very well by Brady Bryson,267 who was
the next junior officer after me, and who was as young or perhaps
even a day or so younger than I was. In any event, Bryson did a
splendid job, and the fear that I had had about criticism for assigning
a young and junior officer to deal with the defendant Schacht-insofar
as I know-never surfaced, despite his acquittal.
In connection with my respective work against Funk, Schacht,
and the Economic Case generally, I interrogated Goering, among
other lesser figures, prior to trial. And of those I met face-to-face,
Goering was to me the most interesting and diabolical. He embodied,
as Hilary Gaskin, a British author said, "the charisma of evil." 26 He
was very quick, very nimble, and wholly unrepentant at pretrial as
well as in the trial itself. Incidentally, as Telford Taylor's memoir
indicates, Goering scored high indeed on the IQ test, ranking only
below Schacht among the defendants. 69
I was temporarily pulled away from the Economic Case and
Funk by a wholly unexpected assignment, which was to work on the
concentration camp case, and which was scheduled for presentation
ten days later. An Army team had been working on that case for
months and, apparently, had been overwhelmed by an information
overload. Anyhow, it had been decided that the team should'be
relieved and that I should go to work on it. Because I could not read
German, I asked for and got the help-the invaluable help-of two
fine lawyers, Dan Margolies and Sidney Jacoby, who could read
German.
We had a seven day deadline for finishing the job; three days
were needed for production, mimeographing and the rest. My
partners ran through the documents and other materials, fired up the
evidence, and I wrote as fast as I could. It was obviously a great
irony that because of some glitch, the evidence regarding
concentration camps, which to some were the mark of the Nazi
regime, had to be organized under great time pressure indeed.

267 See,

e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 264.

268See HILARY GASKIN, EYEWITNESSES AT NUREMBERG xix (1990).
269 Dr. G.M. Gilbert, the official prison psychologist, administered the IQ test. He

described Schacht "as having a brilliant mentality, capable of creative originality."
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 383.
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Our team covered only a part of the concentration camp
evidence. Other evidence of the pervasive role of concentration
camps would emerge, and had emerged, in separate presentations
concerning, for example, the Nazi attacks on labor unions, the
churches, the Jews, and the Gypsies.27° Furthermore, horrible and
vivid evidence regarding the camps had already been introduced out
of order so as to meet the perceived need to add drama, emotion, and
excitement to a primarily documentary case. That evidence consisted
of films taken by American and British troops when they had
liberated Dachau, Buchenwald and Belsen just about fifty years ago
today. 271
Those films were literally sickening, even for the tough
combat-weary troops. The films showed living skeletons and
frightful conditions.272 They also showed the naked bodies of the
dead stacked in large burial pits or sometimes sprawled on the
ground.27 3 Some of these defendants found those films very hard to
stomach indeed.274 Incidently, the April 3, 1995, issue of U.S. News
and World Report has a story on those films and the horrors that the
troops found, as I said, just about fifty years ago today.275

Even without those films, the evidence that made up our case

270 See Mark A. Bland, An Analysis of the United Nations International Tribunal to

Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia: Parallels, Problems,
Prospects, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 233, 236 (1994) (noting the Nazis'
mistreatment of Jews, Gypsies, and Jehovah's Witnesses); see also Rudolf Buschmann,
Workers Participationand Collective Bargainingin Germany, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 26,
33 (1993) (commenting on the Nazis' destruction of the trade union offices).
271See Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness: Screening Nazi Concentration Camps
Before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE L. J. 449-50 (1995) (quoting James Donovan,
an assistant prosecutor, when he told the court that the film had been "taken by Allied
military photographers as the Allied armies in the West liberated the areas in which these
camps were located").
27 See generally id. at 474 (describing the horrors uncovered by the films).
273 Id. (quoting the narrator of the film, who pointed out a "woodshed where limecovered bodies are stacked").
74 Id. at 455-56 (recording the reactions of several defendants upon viewing the
motion picture).
275 Gerald Parshall, Freeing the Survivors, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 3,
1995, at 50.
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was a lawyer's dream and a humanist's nightmare. 76 I do not believe
there is any need or any time for a detailed summary of that
evidence. I do, however, want to mention one item of evidence
because it was so grotesque, so incriminating, and so incredible. It
was, incidentally, the last item of evidence in the case that our team
had prepared. It was a set of seven note books-death books,
really-that related to the Mauthausen concentration camp.277 Two
of those books recorded approximately 300 deaths at that camp on
March 19, 1945. The deaths were recorded as having occurred in
alphabetical order, at brief intervals of time. In each case the cause
of death was recorded as heart failure.278 I still recall the hush in the
courtroom when those books were put into evidence.
Now, I want to shift gears for a moment and say a word
about one of the larger issues raised here, even though it was not
assigned to me. There has been a reference to "victor's justice.279
Now, it is not clear to me what the thrust of that reference is. The
term, which usually is a term of opprobrium, may have been a
criticism of the use of trial procedures. However, it seems to me to
be a criticism of any punishment of the Nazi leadership at all. No
one at the time, or subsequently so far as I know, suggested that the
Nazi leadership not be subjected to punishment by the Allies. If one
recalls the consequences of World War II and the related atrocities,
such a result was out of the question.
John Keegan, in his book on World War II, says that fifty
million people were killed and millions more wounded in body and
in spirit, with their towns, homes, and cultural institutions

276 See generally Douglas, supra note 273 (detailing the atrocities uncovered by the
films and commenting on the proof they supplied for the prosecution).
277See PERSICO, supra note 23, at 114 (describing the "death books" prepared by

the Nazi officers to account for the deaths of the prisoners in the Mauthausen
concentration camp).
278Id.

279

Mariann Meier Wang, The InternationalTribunalforRwanda: Opportunitiesfor

Clarification, Opportunitiesfor Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 177, 192 (1995)
(characterizing the Nuremberg Trials as "Victor's Justice" because "it tried and
convicted only Axis Power citizens and was comprised solely of judges from the Allied
countries .. ");see also supra notes 222-26, and accompanying text (discussing the
applicability of "victor's justice").
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destroyed.2"' If the victors were not to try the architects of those
miseries, they were to either line them up and subject them to
summary punishment or to set them free.2"' It is far from clear why
giving them a chance to defend themselves was the worst of the
options actually open to the Allies.
The criticism "victor's justice" reminds us of the relationship
between justice and power. Obviously, power is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for justice. The lack of power has meant no
justice. If there is to be order and justice, there must be power to
achieve them and sometimes only the victor-the right kind of
victor-has the necessary power.
This point is well-illustrated by the difficulties confronting the
effort to prosecute violations of humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia.282 In this situation, key defendants and suspects are not
in custody; rather, they are in power. There are as yet neither
victors, nor organs of the international community, who are able and
willing to use power in the interest of justice. The resultant problems
for the prosecution will be explored this afternoon.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR BUSH: Thank you very much. I am proud to
introduce our next speaker, Judge Cecelia Goetz, who worked on the
Krupp case.

Judge Cecelia Goetz
HONORABLE CECELIA GOETZ: Thank you. As you know, I
have twenty minutes. I have prepared about three hours worth of
remarks, so I will try to give you this in the most organized way.
I hesitated when this invitation was given to me, or perhaps
See, e.g., JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 190 (1990).
See, e.g., PERSICO, supra note 23, at 437 (asking "if it was wrong to punish
people because the trial machinery was less than perfect, how could it be right to punish
them with no trial at all?").
2
1 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 26, at 220: ("In response to the Yugoslavian crisis,
the United Nations has created the International Tribunal for the the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
280

211

committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia.").
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I should say I hesitated more when I realized that the probable object
was to use Nuremberg as a precedent for trials of the atrocities now
going on elsewhere. I have grave reservations about the usefulness
of Nuremberg as a precedent primarily because of the acceptance of
the defense of "necessity" or coercion in the industrialist cases. Of
course I am terribly anxious not to see such atrocities go unpunished.
However, I think Nuremberg is a flawed precedent. That may be
due to my own personal unhappy experiences there and to the
unsatisfactory outcome of the two cases in which I participated.
Let me note that my credentials for being a part of this august
group are very slim. I have two. First, I spent two years in
Nuremberg almost fifty years ago, and second, I am still alive. The
second is probably the more important of the two. I was not an
international lawyer before I went over to Nuremberg and I have
done nothing in the field of international law since then. As
Professor Bush noted, I have not written anything about Nuremberg
and I myself have wondered why that was.
How did I get to Nuremberg?
When General Taylor was appointed head of the Office of the
Chief of Council for Subsequent Proceedings in the American Zone
of Occupation, I applied to be included. Because I was a woman, a
special waiver from Taylor was needed before the Army would
consent to my joining his staff. To his great credit, in a period of
pervasive gender bias, the waiver was quickly obtained. Subsequent
Proceedings were the proceedings after the large trial against Goering
and other leading Nazis. 283 They were intended as trials of various
significant segments of German society to show the general
participation and support of Hitler in the Nazi world, by judges, the
military, the medical world, the doctors and the killing teams.284
Three industrial firms were prosecuted: Flick, I.G. Farben
and Krupp.285 Their cases were termed the Economic Cases, and

283See

generallyl-15 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18.
284 See Matthew Lippman, The Other Nuremberg: American Prosecutionsof Nazi
War Criminals in Occupied Germany, 3 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1992)
(explaining the scope of the goals of the Allied Control Council of Germany under
Control Council Law No. 10).
285See, e.g., id. at 11-20 (categorizing his discussion of the proceedings against

Speer, I.G. Farben, Flick, and Krupp, among others, as the "Economic Cases").
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were the logical successor to the inclusion of Funk, Speer and
Schacht in the Trial.2" 6 How the three were selected, I do not know.
I arrived in Nuremberg after the selection had been made. I started
out on the Flick case and played a major role in the Krupp case. The
Krupp firm was a natural candidate. It had been the intention in the
original indictment against Goering to include a Krupp defendant.
However, a misunderstanding developed between the English and the
Americans as to which Krupp to prosecute, Gustav Krupp, or his
son, Alfried Krupp.287 The English were talking about Gustav Krupp
who had headed up the firm until around 1943 during the period of
Nazi rearmament.288 We were in favor of indicting Alfried Krupp
because he had been in charge of the Krupp firm during the Nazi
years and really had participated very heavily in government
programs involving the abuse of slave labor. 8 9
In any event, Gustav Krupp was named in the original IMT
indictment, but when he proved to be senile and totally incapable of
carrying on his own defense, he was dropped. 29° A suggestion was

2I6Id; Speer, for example, as Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production,

issued an order in October, 1944, calling for allocation and employment of concentration
camp inmates to aid production of the industries in the "Economic Cases." BENJAMIN
B. FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAVES 111-12.
" "Jackson had petitioned the Court to indict Alfried [Krupp] if it could not try his
father." PERSICO, supra note 23, at 110.
288TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 93.
289 Id. at 93. Taylor gives his insight into the choice between indicting one of the
Krupps:
At no time do the prosecutors appear to have compared Gustav and
Alfried in terms of the charges. If the main emphasis was to be
involvement in the conspiracy to initiate aggressive war, the obvious
choice was Gustav, for he had been the active and responsible head
of the firm throughout the pre-war and early war periods. If the
principal charge was to be war crimes, then the defendant should
have been Alfried, for the principal acts of plunder, and exploitation
of concentration and slave camp labor, had occurred after Alfried
had replaced his father as actual head of the family, and, in 1943, as
sole proprietor of the Krupp enterprise. If the intention was to
pursue both kinds of charges, then both men should have been
indicted. There was nothing complicated about these factors, but
they were never articulated, much less considered.
Id.
2Id.
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made that Alfried Krupp be substituted then and there.2 91
Fortunately, that hasty idea was rejected. However, when the Krupp
firm and Alfried Krupp were ultimately indicted, that confusion hung
over the case. The feeling always persisted, at least among the
Germans, that he was being tried in place of his father; that we were
literally visiting the sins of the father on the son.2 92 None of us
involved in the prosecution so thought, but we were aware of the
murmur in the background.
Farben was selected because of its extensive involvement in
the atrocities that took place at Auschwitz.2 93

Although I am

uncertain as to what led to the prosecution of Flick, it was most
likely the leading role played by its head, Friedrich Flick, in Nazi
organizations and the firm's enterprise in acquiring properties in the
occupied countries. 294 In any event, I did not stay very long on the
Flick case. I was transferred to the Krupp case. I worked on the
aggressive war count, that is, the alleged Crimes Against Peace, until
they were dismissed at the close of the prosecution's case, and then
I stayed as attorney-in-charge of the slave labor counts. So I know
a great deal about the slave labor count in Krupp.2 95 I know very,
29 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 78-79.
292See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 152.

U.S. Assistant Attorney General,

Francis M. Shea, gave the nod to Alfried because a case could be prepared against him
rapidly. Shea also raised concerns about the public perception "that we are going after
the son because the father cannot be tried." Id.
293Id. at 151-52. When Jackson asked Shea for the names of additional economic
defendants, Shea submitted a list that included Alfried Krupp and Herman Schmitz,
Chairman of the Vorstand (managing directorate) of the huge I.G. Farben industrial
combine. Id. See WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 225, at 472 (listing the
defendants in the I.G. Farben case, where 24 leaders of I.G. Farben were charged with
spoilation of property in occupied countries and with participation in a slave labor
program); see also FERENCZ, supra note 288, at 9 (describing the Farben Industry's
choice for a plant location based on its proximity to Auschwitz); id. at 34 (stating that
Auschwitz was financed and owned by Farben).
294See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 285, at 87. Defendants Freidrich Flick and Otto
Steinbrinck were members of Himmler's "Circle of Friends" and voluntarily contributed
substantial funds to the organization. The Tribunal determined that they must have
known of the organization's activities and that it was "immaterial whether it was spent
on salaries or for lethal gas." Id.
295 See, e.g., WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 225, at 475 ("The Krupp
case originally charged 12 executives of the Krupp industrial concern with using slave
labor ....").
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very little about the other Subsequent Proceedings. I do not know
very much even about the other industrialist cases. All that you have
heard from the prior speakers about the difficulties in putting together
a coherent theory, as to aggressive wars, as to conspiracies, and as
to individual responsibility haunted us in the three trials.296
The three trials were very, very time consuming. I think the
Farben case took fifteen months or more. The Krupp case also lasted
about a year. The Flick case was somewhat shorter. They were
very, and I think this is relevant, very expensive cases to try. Not
more so than any of the other cases, but I think all the trials in
Nuremberg were expensive. You had the entire prosecution staff,
lawyers and supporting personnel, research analysts, translators and
so forth. As you have heard, we paid for defense counsel. We
provided them with lodging, transportation and so on. There was an
enormous support staff, a secretariat set up to house witnesses and so
forth. All this was a tremendous enterprise.
What was the outcome? I will summarize the outcome in the
three industrialists cases. I am not familiar with the results in the
other cases that were part of Subsequent Proceedings. I think they
were more successful. I strongly recommend to you the fifteen
volume work that has been put together by Drexel Sprecher on each
of the trials, which also contains a compendium of the various
procedural rulings.297 It is an invaluable body of work for anyone

really interested in what took place.
Three main categories of crimes were charged: first, Crimes
Against Peace, defined as waging or conspiring to wage aggressive
war; second, War Crimes, defined as offenses against persons or
property violating the law or customs of war; and third, Crimes
Against Humanity, defined as inhumane acts, including
enslavement. 9 In addition, some individuals were charged with
membership in groups declared criminal by the IMT. No defendant
296

See

TAYLOR,

supra note 6, at 49 ("Our task was to prepare to prosecute the

leading Nazis on the criminal charges . . . .The blunt fact was that, despite what
'everybody knew' about the Nazi leaders, virtually no judicially admissible evidence was
at hand."); id. at 50 ("This phase of the case is based on the assumption that it is, or
will be declared, a punishable offense to plan and launch an aggressive war.").
297 1-15 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18.
29 See Lippman, supra note 285, at 1; Modern Law of War, supra note 15, at
2031-33.
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was found guilty of a Crime Against Peace. Flick was not indicted
for such a crime. 299 However, Krupp and Farben were. 3" As I said
to you, in the Krupp case the aggressive war counts were thrown out
at the end of the prosecution's case based on the IMT precedent, and
in particular, the acquittal of Schacht. 30 ' The theory was that if
Schacht wasn't found to have knowledge of Hitler's intent to wage
aggressive war, Krupp must have lacked that knowledge as well.30 2
Similarly in the Farben case, no one was convicted of Crimes
Against Peace for analogous reasons.30 3
Despite the evidence that all three firms had participated in
the Government's slave labor program and that all of them had
employed prisoners of war under terms that violated the rules of war,
few defendants, except in the Krupp case, were convicted of War
Crimes or Crimes against Humanity. 3" In the Farben case, nine out
of the twenty-three directors-defendants were found guilty of
corporate plunder in occupied territories, while only five of the
defendants were held to be criminally liable for the abuse of slave
labor. 305 Also, three defendants out of six were acquitted in the Flick

9 "Friedrich Flick was charged with criminal conduct relating to slave labor and
the spoliation of property in occupied France and the Soviet Union, and the
'Aryanization' of Jewish industrial and mining properties." See WAR CRIMES, WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 225, at 472.
See generally Lippman, supra note 285, at 11-20 (discussing the proceedings
against the Farben and Krupp corporations, as well as the underlying facts which led to
their indictments).
101Counts One and Four, charging the defendants with the commission of crimes
against peace by helping to wage aggressive war, were dismissed by the Court before
the defendants presented their case. The court reasoned that "the prosecution . . . had
failed 'to show beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the defendants [were] guilty..
. there can be no conviction without proof of personal guilt."' See FERENCZ, supra note
288, at 71.
"2 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 80-81, 264-65, 386-87, 564-66; see PERSICO, supra
note 23, at 401-02.
3o3"[Tihe Tribunal failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants
were aware of [any] ...criminal practice," such as providing deadly drugs and gas to
concentration camps. Lippman, supra note 285, at 20.
- See id. at 17-18 (arguing that the convictions in the Krupp case were based upon
a willingness and ardent desire to employ forced labor, since the act of using forced
labor was committed in the absence of compulsion).
3 See FERENCZ, supra note 288, at 34.
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case.3" 6 However, in the Krupp case, no one was fully acquitted.
Six of the ten defendants were convicted of spoliation, that is, the
plunder of property in the occupied territories; all were convicted of
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity based on the Nazi slave
labor program.3 °7
Let me say something about the tribunals. After Justice
Jackson participated in the initial trial, it was decided that no federal
judges should participate in Subsequent Proceedings. As a result, the
tribunals were made up of judges from state courts. Their views
differed greatly, as did the background they brought to the trials. In
the Krupp case, Judge Wilkins wrote several brilliant concurring and
dissenting opinions, as did Judge Hebert, a former law school dean,
in the Farben case.
Now, the upshot of the trials was not only proof of slave
labor in the Farben and Krupp cases, but also proof of wholesale
cooperation in the worst aspects of the slave labor program. In the
Farben case, and I think it is now common knowledge, you had the
Buna plant set up in Auschwitz in which tens of thousands of Jewish
workers were worked to death with the threat of extermination held
over them.3 °8 Krupp likewise set up a number of operations in about
six or seven concentration camps.3° 9 In addition to setting up
operations in concentration camps, Krupp brought some 600 or more
women-generally referred to as the "Hungarian Jewesses," although
they came from Czechoslovakia-to the Krupp plant in Essen310 and
See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 285, at 19 n.122.
See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 285, at 17.

See generally 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF THE HOLOCAUST

107-19 (1990) [hereinafter

Holocaust].
3o9 See, e.g., 2 HOLOCAUST, supra note 310, at 842.

In exchange for generous

contributions to the Nazi party and the SS, Krupp was rewarded by Hitler with slave
labor consisting of 100,000 Jewish, Polish and Russian prisoners. The inhuman
treatment of these prisoners resulted in the death of 80 percent of the work force. At
one fuse factory at Auschwitz, "Jews were worked to a state of collapse and then
gassed." Id.
310 See 3 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 445.
For example, at Camp
Humboldtstrasse, 600 Jewish females were brought in from Buchenwald to work at the
Krupp factories. Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, a senior camp doctor who inspected the
conditions at Humboldtstrasse, noted that the 600 Jewish females there were "suffering
from open festering wounds and other ailments," and "the amount of food in the camp
was extremely meager and of very poor quality." Id.
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set up a miniature concentration camp for them there, in which they
were worked under circumstances bound to lead to their death had
they not been sent away for slaughter before the Allies arrived. 3 ' To

quote the IMT judgment, the use of concentration camp labor
involved conditions "which made labor and death almost synonymous
terms."31 2 These women were given inadequate food. One bowl of
soup a day seems to have been the conventional diet.313 They had no
decent clothes, they had one blanket with which to cover themselves,
and they walked back and forth between the factory and the camp in
the snow without proper shoes.3"' All this was seen by the people in
Essen.
However, despite this overwhelming evidence of the nature
of the Nazi slave labor program, none of which was denied, the
sentences imposed were minimal, except in Krupp.315 In the Flick
case, where the Tribunal found that the prosecution had failed to
prove that the labor employed was done under inhuman conditions,
one sentence was two-and-a-half years. Friedrich Frick himself was
sentenced to seven years.31 6 In the Farben case, in which several of
the defendants were found guilty of various crimes, the heaviest
sentence I think was seven years.3" 7 In the Krupp case, however, our
311See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 431 (summarizing Jaeger's testimony that Krupp's

camps were "grossly inadequate in food, clothes, shelter and medical supplies").
32 InternationalMilitary Tribunal, JudicialDecisions, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 231
(1946) [hereinafter Judicial Decisions] (quoting the decision of the IMT).
3133 BLUE SERIES, supra note 22, at 441-42. Foreign workers at the Krupp factories
were given insufficient food to perform their slave labor. The prescribed diet for the
workers was 1000 calories a day less than the diet prescribed for a German citizen.
Workers were given two meals a day, one of which consisted of a "thin, watery soup."
Id. Workers were supposed to be given a small quantity of meat once a week, but this
meat was often withheld. The meat that was given to the prisoners was horse meat or
tuberculin-infested inferior meat that had been rejected by the veterinarian. Id.
314 "The sole clothing of each consisted of a sack with holes for their arms and
head." Id. at 445.
315 See WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 225, at 475 (listing individual
sentences for each of the Krupp defendants).
316 Flick was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Id. at 472.
317 The I.G. Farben case charged twenty-four defendants with "spoliation of property
in occupied countries and with participation in a slave labor program." Id. The longest
sentence in the I.G. Farben case was eight years, given to two defendants, Otto Ambros
and Walter Durrfeld. Other defendants received sentences ranging from one-and-a-half
years to seven years imprisonment. Ten defendants were acquitted. Id.
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tribunal handed down sentences going up to twelve years and ordered
the confiscation of the Krupp property, all of which was owned by
Alfried Krupp under a special law that had been passed for his
benefit." 8
Now, what is the explanation for these minimal sentences in
Flick and Farben? The tribunals that heard these two cases accepted
the defense of necessity or coercion.319 That defense was accepted
despite the fact that the Charter and Control Council Law No.
10321-the jurisdictional basis for these trials-provided that necessity
or coercion were not excuses, but were to be used only in mitigation
of sentencing.321

The defendants were successful in the Flick case in
persuading the judges to accept this defense, which was then followed
in the Farben case.
However, the defense was rejected as
inapplicable in the Krupp case, where the Court said:
Assuming for present purposes the existence of the
tyrannical and oppressive regime

. . .

which is relied

upon as a basis for the application of the rule of
necessity, the competent and credible evidence leaves
no doubt that in committing the acts here charged as
crimes, the guilty individuals were not acting under
compulsion or coercion ...within the meaning of the

law of necessity.322
318Id. at 475; cf. John H. E. Fried, The Sword and the Gavel: By the Last of the

Nuremberg Judges, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 895, 896-97 (1982) (book review) (noting that
Krupp's sentence was commuted to time served and his property, which was obtained
primarily through theft and pillage, was ordered returned to him).
319
See generally James C. O'Brien, CurrentDevelopment: The InternationalTribunal
For Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw In The Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 639, 648-49 (1993) (noting that some post-World War II tribunals have
required that crimes against humanity be organized or approved by a government in
some fashion before prosecutions of individuals could proceed).
320 See generally Dina G. McIntyre, War Crimes Trails, The Niiernberg Trials, 24
U. PITT. L. REV. 73, 101-02 (1962). There were two important differences between
Control Council Law No. 10 and the crimes listed in Article 6 of the London Charter.
First, Law No. 10 specifically made "invasions" punishable, not just "wars" of
aggression. Second, Law No. 10 actually defined crimes against humanity. Id. at 102.
321See London Charter, supra note 94, at art. 8.
322Matthew Lippman, supra note 285, at 18 (paraphasing the Krupp Court).
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The Court found that the defendants acted not from
"necessity," but from what they perceived to be a "sense of duty. " 323
In the end, however, it made no difference what the Krupp Court
found. When John McCloy came to review the sentences imposed,
he said that the sentences in the Krupp case were out of line from
Flick cases, and he reduced them for
those in the Farben and
3 24
purposes of consistency.
In actuality, this equalizing of sentences was inconsistent with
the doctrine of individual responsibility of each defendant in each
case, in which each defendant was tried on the basis of his own
involvement.3 25 It made sense, however, because all three had been
involved in the same slave labor program.326
Why was the defense of necessity accepted? I think that
General Taylor put it the best when he argued against the claim of
necessity in the Flick case. He said:
The leading defendants, Flick and Steinbrinck, were
not reluctant dragons. All the defendants are
uncommonly able to take care of themselves, and
have been phenomenally successful at accomplishing
what they set out to do. To suggest that these men,
whose enterprises flourished like the green bay tree
under Hitler and who occupied the most powerful and
privileged positions in the German industrial fabric,
spent twelve years skulking about in fear and doing
what they did not want to do is ridiculous.
This whole line of argument would never had
been made, I am sure, except for one circumstance.
These crimes were connected with the war and the
323Id.
324See,

e.g., WAR

CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS,

supra note 225, at 471-75 (stating that

the highest sentence in the Flick and Farben cases was seven and eight years,
respectively, while the highest sentence in the Krupp case was twelve years, plus the loss
of all property, for ostensibly the same slave labor offenses); see generally Fried, supra
note 318, at 896-97 (reporting that in May, 1951, U.S. High Commissioner for
Germany, John J. McCloy, "released Alfried Krupp from prison and restored to him all
his properties.").
325See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 44-45.
326See, e.g., WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 225, at 471-75.
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war is something everyone would like to forget. The
eyes of the world are now focused on other things.
For this reason defense counsel has told us-and no
doubt will tell us again-that the trial of these
defendants is a mere anachronism.
But the
reconstruction which the world needs is not merely
material but also moral reconstruction.327
At the time General Taylor made those remarks the Cold War
had already started.32 8 We kept our cars in Nuremberg fueled up in
case there was a Russian invasion, and Germany was already
considered a valuable ally. Enthusiasm for the war crimes trials had
substantially diminished.
It was unfortunate that the Doctrine of Necessity was accepted
in Nuremberg because its acceptance, I think, largely undermines the
value of the trials. During the Farben case, Judge Hebert pointed out
that accepting the Doctrine of Necessity relieves almost everyone in
a totalitarian society from taking responsibility. Everyone can claim
that he was terrorized and there is no individual responsibility under
such circumstances. Judge Hebert said:
Such a doctrine constitutes, in my opinion, unbridled
license for the commission of War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity on the broadest possible scale
through the simple expediency of the issuance of
compulsory governmental regulations combined with
the terrorism of the totalitarian or police state.329

Not only was the Doctrine of Necessity inimical to what we
had set out to accomplish in Nuremberg, but other rulings were also
discouraging. Mention has already been made of the fact that the
aggressive war counts, the Crimes Against Peace, were all dismissed
on the basis of the IMT decision, which had held that in order to be
guilty of aggressive war you had to know of Hitler's aggressive
3276

GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, at 973-74.
"I Taylor's closing arguments took place on November 24, 1947. 6 GREEN SERIES,
supra note 18, at 970-74.
319 8 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, at 1310.
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intentions to wage aggressive war.330 In order to be cognizant of
that, you had to be present at four meetings."' Now, it is true that
there is language in the Tribunal's decision that indicates that you
could know about Hilter's plan to wage an aggressive war without
necessarily having been present at those meetings,33z but in practice
it turned out it was almost impossible to prove.
Furthermore, while Control Council Law No. 10 defines
Crimes Against Humanity as including actions taken against citizens
because of their religious or political or other affiliations,333 I think
that became a dead issue, at least in the industrialist cases, because
of the IMT precedent. The Krupp Tribunal was careful to say that
all the charges of Crimes Against Humanity presented to it were also
War Crimes. I think the other cases likewise avoided holding that
there could be a Crime Against Humanity that was not also a War
Crime. 3

I realize that my time is limited, but I would like to just refer
to a few things which I think made the trials of the industrialists
extremely difficult and which would probably be duplicated in
Rwanda.
One thing was the difficulty of working in a strange language
which required translation of everything that was submitted-the
burden of interpretation.335 Another problem which we encountered
in Nuremberg was the widespread destruction of evidence, of records
and of witnesses. Both in Krupp and in Farben there had been large
3

JudicialDecisions, supra note 314, at 223 (stating that in order to be found guilty
of aggressive war charges, the defendants had to have knowledge of the plans and must
have been involved in the concrete planning to wage war).
331 Id. at 188. These meetings took place on November 5, 1937, May 23, 1939,
August 22, 1939, and November 23, 1939. These meetings were continually referred
to by the IMT in their determination of whether the defendants participated in waging
or planning an aggressive war. Id.
332 See, e.g., id. at 272-332 (discussing how each defendant's role in these meetings
helped to determine their fate under the aggressive war charges).
33 Control Council Law No. 10 for the Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, art. II, s.I(c), reprintedin THE
FIRST GERMAN WAR CRIMES TRIAL 27 (W. Paul Burman ed., 1985).
3
1 See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 285, at 19-20 (discussing the charges against the
defendants in the other economic cases).
311 McIntyre, supra note 320, at 102 (discussing the set-up of the complex translation
system used at the trials).
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bonfires before the trial started in which a great deal of evidence was
destroyed. Witnesses were also eliminated before the Americans
arrived. Before the Americans arrived at Krupp, many slave laborers
were sent to the Buchenwald death camp to be killed.336 In view of
that, I am troubled by the dismissal at the end of the prosecution's
case, in Krupp, of the Aggressive War count on the ground that the
prosecution had failed to make out a prima facie case-and that if the
defendants were then compelled to put in their evidence, they might
fill the gaps in the prosecution case and, thereby prove the charges
against themselves.33 7 The Court said that it would be unfair to

compel evidence from the defendants when the prosecution failed to
carry its burden.
Now, at the time, this ruling seemed to me to be entirely
appropriate and perfectly consistent with our practice, as I knew it.
But in preparing for today, I questioned the reasonableness of
applying that rule to defendants who had engaged in the wholesale
destruction of documents and witnesses in anticipation of these very
trials, particularly if the Tribunal was of the opinion, as Presiding
Judge Anderson wrote in a concurring opinion, "that aggressive war
is the supreme crime, and no penalty is too severe for those who are
responsible for it."338 Judge Wilkins, while concurring in the result,
thought the evidence pertaining to knowledge and participation in
aggressive war was "well nigh compelling" for several defendants. 33 9

In Krupp, unlike the other cases, none of the defendants ever took the
witness stand, although their attorneys presented evidence on the

11 See, e,g,, FERENCZ, supra note 133, 302, at 96 (stating Krupp shipped female
slave laborers to Buchenwald). Films of Buchenwald, taken by American and British
troops, "were hard to bear . . . . The frightful condition of the living and the cascade
of naked corpses pushed by bulldozers into an immense burial ditch, were wrenching
sights." TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 187.
I" See generally TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 81 (stating that the evidence against
Krupp was "at best uncertain"); id. at 154 (describing the prosecution's portrayal of the
Krupp family as the "'beneficiary of the most sinister forces engaged in menacing the
peace of Europe,' and as the industrial linchpin of Hitler's rise to power and Germany's
rearmament"). Krupp's own documents supported the prosecution's argument. Id.
338 See, e.g., Gross & Fried, supra note 318, at 895-96 (quoting from the Krupp
Tribunal).
339 See, e.g., id. at 895 (quoting Judge Wilkins from the Krupp Tribunal).
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counts that were not dismissed.34 °
Apart from the acceptance of the defense of necessity and the
change in the overall political situation, what explains the results in
the Subsequent Proceedings on the industrialists cases? I think one
factor was that we started with the Flick Case in which, apparently,
" ' In fact, the Flick
the evidence was weaker than the other cases.34
Tribunal said the charge of slave labor exploited under inhuman
conditions was not sustained by the proof.34 2 I find that difficult to
reconcile with the Flick defense that the firm had no choice but to
employ slave labor under conditions laid down by the SS in order to
meet production quotas . 34 However, the Flick Tribunal, while
accepting that defense, found no evidence of mistreatment. 344
Professor Meltzer has indirectly referred to another problem
that we faced: the fact that we were all very young. The prosecution

340 See, e.g., PERSICO, supra note 23, at 110. Gustav Krupp never took the stand
because he was dying of old age. He was permitted to live at home where he suffered
from "hardening of the arteries, incipient senility, partial paralysis, incontinence, and
impaired speech." Id. Krupp's son, Alfried, was president of the Krupp works
throughout the war; the prosecution petitioned the court to indict Alfried Krupp as an
alternative to his ailing father for prosecution. However, Alfried never testified, and the
judges refused to indict him. Id.
34 But see TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 351:
In the cases of Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Frank,
Frick, and Streicher-the quality, scope, and content of the
prosecution's evidence were clearly sufficient to support a conviction
under the charges in the Indictment. In no case except Streicher's
was there substantial question about the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a capital sentence. In all cases the sentences were
reviewed and confirmed by the Control Council, and the defendants
were hanged.
Id.
32 See generally TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 480 (stating that Flick's attorney, Dr.
Otto Pannenbecker, "was very effective in distancing Flick from involvement in
aggressive wars and shifting the blame for atrocities to Himmler and his minions.").
31 See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 285, at 18 (finding that "the defendants in the
Krupp Case tried to contend that production quotas that were established by the Nazis
and the labor shortage forced them to make use of prisoners of war, concentration camp
inmates and involuntary labor from the occupied territories."). They argued that had
they refused "they would have suffered dire consequences at the hands of the
government." Id.
3" See generally TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 561 (noting that Flick was indicted under
all four counts, yet found guilty under only Counts Two, Three, and Four).
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attorneys were all very young. We did not speak German. I was
unfamiliar with the Nazi bureaucracy, and I think that was true of
most of my fellow prosecutors. Because I did not speak German, I
had to rely on "research analysts," whose job it was to locate
documentary evidence among the masses of papers.
These research analysts were for the most part young. They
were unsophisticated,, and in some cases, even hostile to what we
were doing. It was their job to prepare a short summary-a very
cryptic summary-of the documents that held evidentiary value in
their opinion. Looking at that summary, we had to decide whether
or not the document was going to be worthwhile, and we were bound
to guess wrong. The fact that I was first able to prove the magnitude
of the slave labor case only after receiving the documents produced
by the defendants is indicative of how poorly equipped we were to
deal with the German documents. The defense documents contained
evidence of the abuse and
overwhelming and incontrovertible
3 45
labor.
slave
of
mistreatment
The third factor, which again has been touched on by
Professor Meltzer, is that Nuremberg itself was a very unpleasant
345See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 267 (noting Sprecher's involvment in the case
against Baldur Von Schivach, who was involved "in administering the use of slave
labor"). A letter written by Kaltenbrunner to SS Brigadefuehrer Blaschke stated:
According to previous experience it is estimated that 30% of the
transport will consist of Jews able to work, approximately 3,600 in
this case, who can be utilized for the work in question, it being
understood that they are subject to removal at any time . . . .The
women and children of these Jews who are unable to work, and who
are all being kept in readiness for a special action and therefore one
day will be removed again, must stay in the guarded camp also
during the day.
Id. at 361. An address by Frank to a meeting of German officials at Cracow contained
the following:
As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite frankly
that they must be done away with one way or another . . . .We will
principally have pity on the German people only and nobody else in
the whole world. As an old National Socialist I must also say: This
war would be only a partial success if the whole lot of Jewry would
survive it, while we would have shed our last blood to save whole
Europe .... Gentlemen, I must ask you to arm yourselves against
all feeling of pity. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever it is
possible, in order to maintain the structure of the Reich as a whole.
Id. at 201.
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place to be. It had been bombed out. We were not supposed to
fraternize with Germans. We did not go to German restaurants and
so on, and I think this affected the judges. I don't think that they had
planned on being in Nuremberg for two years, and I think they got
very impatient with us, as I am told sequestered jurors get impatient.
And, at the end of the' trial, they were apt to vent their displeasure on
us for its length. Furthermore, after listening for two years to an
unbroken litany of atrocities it was easy to credit the defendants'
claim that they too had been victims of the constant terror. Reference
should also be made to the limiting effect of the IMT precedent.346
Before I conclude, let me acknowledge the brillant leadership
of General Telford Taylor, who headed up Subsequent Proceedings,
and did an outstanding job of putting the crimes charged into their
historic context. You should try to obtain the volumes that Mr.
Sprecher has assembled, if only for the opening statements of General
Telford Taylor.
PROFESSOR BUSH: Thank you very much, Judge.
speaker is Mr. Drexel Sprecher.

34 See PERSICO, supra note 23, at 442.
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Mr. Drexel Sprecher
MR. DREXEL SPRECHER: I was described as the cleanup person
here but I don't find too much that I want to clean up. With your
permission, I'm going to jump around a little bit concerning the six
years that I worked on the trials-four at Nuremberg, and two back
at the Pentagon finishing the editing of the so-called "Green
Volumes," the fifteen volumes of the last twelve trials. 4
Some people have wondered how we each got to Nuremberg.
In my case it was rather simple. I read Justice Jackson's first report
to President Truman,348 which was widely publicized in the papers,
and I immediately went back to OSS, where I had worked during
parts of the war, and arranged to meet with Jim Donovan, the general
counsel of OSS. I told him I had done a paper on Nazi Germany
when I was a senior in college, that I had worked with German
agents and trained some of them in North Africa. I told him that
these agents had later parachuted into Germany ahead of the Allied
troops, and that I had a great interest in joining the prosecution.
Within a half hour he hired me and I sat in his outside office for the
next month going back and forth to the Research and Analysis
Division of Office of Strategic Services where there were really
tremendous tomes of analyses and quite a bit of evidence.
A scholar by the name of Franz Neumann, who wrote the
book Behemoth,349 was employed by OSS. When I went to see him
I told him, among other things, that I was interested in how the Nazis
had destroyed the German trade unions. Neumann said that he could
produce a copy of the order that was circulated. He pulled out a
German book in which a person who had been in the Reichs Ministry
of Labor had written about the development of the German Labor
Front after the German trade unions were taken over. Additionally,
as an appendix, the author included the order of Robert Ley35 °

3' GREEN

SERIES,

supra note 18.

348 REPORT, supra note 77, at
349 FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL
SOCIALISM (1944).
350 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 85, 104 (describing Robert Ley as the leader
of the German Labor Front under Hitler which led the movement to suppress and replace
the existing labor unions).
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authorizing the take over of the trade unions on May 2, 1933.351 I
immediately had this document translated, and it became the
centerpiece of a brief on the destruction of the trade unions. That
brief was the first completed brief, I believe, that was circulated
among the American prosecution staff in Nuremberg.
One of the reasons was that in Nuremberg there were several
35 2
German citizens who had been in the Dachau concentration camp
and who had been trade union leaders.353 Several of these people had
survived.
Some of the other trade union leaders had been
murdered, 354 but the survivors were able to furnish evidence by
affidavit, and not one of them was called for cross-examination by the
defense at any point because their testimony simply elaborated on
what we already had in this contemporaneous document. When I was
shipped overseas to work with the Prosecution, I quickly went to
Paris where, under Colonel Robert G. Storey, 311 who became head
31 See, e.g., PERSICO, supra note 23, at 64 (charaterizing Robert Ley as the

"destroyer of German labor unions and creater of the ersatz Nazi Labor Front"); see
also THE BLACK BOOK, supra note 3. at 26-27:
Goebbels in his diary . . . makes this simple entry for May Day,
1933: "Tomorrow we shall seize the houses of the Trade Union."
The trade unions were broken up, and German labor was forced into
the strait-jacket . . . of Dr. Ley's Labor Front. It was a priceless
victory for the Krupps . . . and the rest of the industrialists. They
would not again be hampered by the demands of free labor.
3 See generally THE BLACK BOOK, supra note 3, at 259-64. Founded in the
Bavarian market town of Dachau in 1933, the camp was liberated by the American
Seventh Army on April 29, 1945:
American soldiers and subsequently officials and newspaper
representatives told of the cramped barracks surrounded by charged
wire and a fifteen-foot moat, of the regularly spaced machine gun
towers, of the bullet-studded pillories and scarred whipping posts,
the gas chambers and crematories.
Id.
3-3 See, e.g., PETER HOFFMAN, THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN RESISTANCE 19331945, at 33 (1977).
31 See, e.g., id. at 532-33. The trade union leader, Ernst Schneppenhorst, was
killed by the SS leaders on April 24, 1945. Just one day before, union leader Johannes
Albers was liberated by the Red Army despite having been condemned to death. Id. at
532.
351 Colonel Robert Storey, a Texas Lawyer, served in the United States Air Force
in legal and intelligence capacities. Justice Jackson personally recruited Storey to the
prosecution's team. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 56.
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of the Documentation Division, we were collecting tremendous
amounts of contemporaneous German documents.
Among other things, the defendant Alfred Rosenberg, who
wrote Myth of the 20th Century,35 6 had buried his documents behind

a kind of a double wall. However, a German who saw him do this,
or who participated in doing it, told the Americans that this had been
done and immediately we went and grabbed those documents. In the
Paris OSS office, at Seven Rue de Pressbourge, the documents were
lined up with the straw still sticking out of them that Rosenberg used
to hide them.
Colonel Storey said to me, "Sprecher, the research analysts
have been finding all kinds of materials on the treatment of Jews and
Gypsies and other opponents of the Nazi regime, but I have very little
from the Rosenberg files that bears on aggressive war. Will you try
to find me something?" So I went out and had a drink that night at
supper time and came back, and with my primitive German-I had
had three-and-a-half years in college, but that did not make me very
fluent-I tried to figure out how I could find something in all these
Leitz Ordner notebooks which were stacked all around two rooms.
So I looked around, and among the large notebooks I saw one
small one, which had on it the label, "A.P.A. Norwegen," which
was the Foreign Political Office in Norway. So I said, "Well, let's
see what's in here just before the invasion of Norway." Sure
enough, there was proof that Vidkun Quisling357 and a fellow by the
name of Hagelin, who was Quisling's deputy, both Norwegians, had
come down to Berlin and had met with Hitler. After the German
Nazis invaded Norway, they became two of the principal leaders
under the Nazis. Quisling was later tried, found guilty of treason,
,and executed.358 After I had found these documents and turned them
over to Colonel Storey, he immediately took the notebook back to
Justice Jackson in London. Justice Jackson then informed the

356 ALFRED ROSENBERG, THE MYTH OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1930); see also
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 364 (stating that this book became recognized as a "Nazi
bible," second only to Mein Kampl).
3' See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 195 (identifying Vidkun Quisling as a Norwegian
traitor who was instrumental in assisting Rosenberg to persuade Hitler to invade
Norway).
358See, e.g., 3 HOLOCAUST, supra note 310, at 1204.
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Norwegian representatives in London of the discovery. Within
several days two Norwegian investigators were in Paris asking me
where I had found these documents. I said that they came from one
of the many notebooks in the two rooms, but the entire notebook on
Norway had been taken to London. Those two gentlemen later
became representatives of the Norwegian government at Nuremberg.
I was very pleased that I had had the good luck of finding documents
which helped convict Quisling, in Norway, as a traitor to his country.
People often ask what was the high point of being in
Nuremberg for so long. Well, actually, it wasn't that I was selected
to present the principal case against two defendants."' The high
point for me was the first day of the trial, November 20, 1945.
There were hardly any passes for junior counsel, and I sat in the last
row of the balcony and looked down and saw the defendants being
ushered into the dock just before the beginning of the trial. I must
say, and I can still remember, that I kind of wept. It seemed that
here was consummation; that somehow I had wondered whether a
trial would really take place, and here it was taking place. That was
the high point for me, the actual beginning of the trial. I remember
having taken my pass, after I had been there and watched the trial for
the first hour or so, and I allowed other people on my staff to use my
pass and to watch the trial on opening day. The reading of the
indictment was the main subject of the proceeding that day.
I have mentioned Justice Jackson's first report to President
Truman.360 Parts of that report included genuinely eloquent language.
It moved me greatly. I recall talking to Telford Taylor as we were
preparing the subsequent trials and I said, "Well, we have a lot more
evidence than we had at the beginning." Telford Taylor said that we
lacked someone with Justice Jackson's eloquence. I should say this:
I think the eloquence of Telford Taylor in the opening statements,
and his own vision, and his ability to condense and put into
impressive language the work which the rest of us had done, was
amazing. I think we are very fortunate that the first United States
Chief of Counsel, Justice Jackson, and his successor, Brigadier
General Telford Taylor, both had this vision and capacity for analysis
I" Sprecher presented the cases against Baldur von Schirach and Hans Fritzsche.
See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 267, 461.
3
See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
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and eloquent expression.
I should perhaps say something as a cleanup man about this
international atmosphere at Nuremberg. During the first trial, I think
there must have been representatives attached to the Prosecution from
perhaps a dozen countries, certainly from Poland, Yugoslavia,
Norway, the Netherlands, and a number of other countries.3 6 ' A
number of these people naturally would have liked to present
evidence to the Tribunal and to get some headlines back home, but
the chief prosecutors took a very firm line that no one was to make
a presentation unless he was a member of the staff of one of the four
signatory nations.362 I think that was a wise policy: if any of these
representatives who were close to some type of atrocity or crime had
been allowed to address the court, they would have taken a long time
in presenting irrelevant issues, in view of all the evidence that we
had. These people did move in and out of Nuremberg. We gave
them access to all the documents we had and it really helped make
Nuremberg a place which, at the time, was a liaison center for a lot
of countries. The welding together of the four delegations, the
interviewing of witnesses and the developing of the briefs, as
Professor Meltzer has indicated, was really a tremendous
organizational achievement.161 It was often done under pressure and
deadlines.
The low point in my feelings about Nuremberg was when
John McCloy, United States Commissioner to Germany, made his
clemency rulings absent any contact with Prosecution representatives
to counterbalance the claims being made by the defendants. 3" I don't
think that those clemency orders particularly helped in terms of
winning more Germans to help us in the Cold War. I still cannot

16' See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 218 (discussing these countries' roles as
observers and occasional presenters of evidence).
32 See id. at 218-19. Despite the fact that small delegations representing "countries

occupied by the Nazi forces" wanted to present evidence before the Tribunal, they were
prevented from doing so, partly because the Court's interpreting system was not
equipped to handle more than four languages. Id.
I See, e.g., Martin Gilbert, How Justice Was Done at Nuremburg, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1992, at 15 (stating that "[m]ore than 2000 days of intense terror, involving
more than 20 million victims, had to be made as explicable as possible . . . . This was
a gargantuan task.
...).
364 See WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 225, at 241.
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understand why it was done, and it is a low point as I look back at
the Trial.
I was glad to notice today that there has been some mention
of the Gypsies. Often, because the Nazis spoke so much about the
evils of the Jewish race, they did not speak much about the Gypsies.
However, in their orders for the persecution of Jews and others, the
Gypsies invariably followed the Jews. The Nazi orders which sent
the Jews to Auschwitz name the Jews first, followed immediately by
the Gypsies.365 I think this is one point which has been overlooked
in the literature on the trials and the Nazi regime-the fact that the
percentage of Gypsies murdered was equal to the percentage of Jews
who were killed.366 Somehow this is overlooked because the Nazis

did not speak much about what they were doing to the Gypsies,
although we found it in their orders.
Let me end on that point and allow time for questions. Thank
you.
Questions
PROFESSOR BUSH: Thank you. A moderator's delight. As
promised, I will at this point invite our two distinguished
commentators, if they wish, to chime in; otherwise, Professor
Wechsler has graciously indicated that he will be available during the
day to anyone who wishes to ask him questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I want to address Judge Goetz. Did I
understand you to say that all Crimes Against Humanity had to be
War Crimes in Nuremberg, or was it within the context of the Trial
that Germany had started a war?
HONORABLE GOETZ: I was talking about the context of the trials
and particularly the industrialists cases. I noticed a strong reluctance

See Hersh Ginsberg & Abraham Gross, Rabbis Urge ConstitutionalAmendment
Against Euthanasia, 11 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 215, 216 (1995 ).
I See Lara Leibman, From Nuremberg to Bosnia: Consistent Application of
International Law, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 705, 708, 724 n.123 (noting that millions of
innocent civilians, including Gypsies, were murdered by the Nazis, and that the Serbs
have portrayed modern day Croatia as a reincarnation of such atrocities).
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to find anything to be a Crime against Humanity that was not also a
War Crime.
You cannot say that categorically because it is a good deal
like some antitrust decisions. A lot of facts were recited and then
said this is a Crime Against Humanity. But that is why I said
Nuremberg is a flawed precedent because it-at least in the
industrialists trials, I don't know about the others-there was a
reluctance to find anything to be a Crime Against Humanity if it was
not a War Crime.3 67

AUDIENCE MEMBER:
This didn't preclude finding Crimes
Against Humanity as being separate from War Crimes, did it?
MR. WOLFE: Basically, in both the IMT and the subsequent
cases-particularly the medical case and I believe the justice case and
above all the ministry's case-anything a power said before
September 1939 against their own citizens did not come within the
jurisdiction of the court. 368 The reasons go back to the fact that no
power wants to have anybody interfering with what they do with their
own citizens. Whether that's good or bad is something else.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sir, one more
about is if it was just what happened
because Crimes Against Humanity could
that mean that Nuremberg didn't set a
unless there was a war?

thing. What I was curious
or whether it was stated,
only be War Crimes, does
precedent for interference

PROFESSOR BUSH: You mean during a War?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Had to be.

I See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment, State Responsibility to Investigate and
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in InternationalLaw, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 451,
463 (1990) (discussing that acts committed before the war are not Crimes Against
Humanity because they were not committed in connection with War Crimes); see also
Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of InternationalLaw,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 84 (1994) ("Nuremberg Tribunal did not consider crimes
committed before the war to be Crimes Against Humanity.").
3 See TUTOROW, supra note 225, 12 (stating that "IMT defendants could not be
tried for any crimes against humanity committed before the declaration of war in 1939").
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PROFESSOR WECHSLER: If you would look at the judgment by
the Tribunal at the International Military Tribunal, you will see that
the Crimes Against Humanity were forwarded into, coalesced with
War Crimes established. 369 It was also a suggestion-a passive
suggestion-that if you could connect some atrocity with a crime of
aggression under counts one or two that might be a separate place for
criminality.
But in terms of the concentration camps before 1930, before
the war started in 1939, all those charges were basically wiped out
and the great concern was retroactivity, as well as interference with
internal affairs.370 Since that time there have, of course, been
conventions against genocide that were separate and independent from
war crimes, and those conventions might be a basis for jurisdiction
without the connection with an aggressive war.3 7'
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was struck by Mr. Sprecher's remark
about the commutation of the sentences by then high Commissioner
McCloy.
At the break I was asking Mr. Jackson and Mr. Wolfe about
this issue. They had some interesting remarks. I wonder if they
could discuss it among themselves right now for the benefit of the
entire audience.
MR. WOLFE: You have to understand that John McCloy had no
particular ideas of his own. He pitched in. He, as Assistant
Secretary of War, had as much to do with the momentum that
brought the United States to persuade the other nations to conduct
these trials. But he didn't really get involved in the thinking of it.
He was a facilitator, and an excellent one. And what he did in this

36 Seventeen defendants were charged under both Count Three (War Crimes) and
Count Four (Crimes Against Humanity). Two of the seventeen were acquitted of both
counts, one was found guilty under Count Three and acquitted under Count Four, and
the other 14 defendants were found guilty of both counts. Id. at 464-65.
370 The Tribunal limited its jurisdiction only to crimes that occurred "in execution
of, or in connection with" war, and does not extend to crimes against humanity that
occurred before 1939. See, e.g., Lynn Berat, Genocide: The Nambian Case Against
Germany, 5 PACE INT'L L. REV. 165, 204-05 (1993).
37 See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 155.
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case was listen to his clemency board. And it is true that the Cold
War had started, but there was also something else that we can see
in our own courts: justice delayed is justice weakened.372 If you
could hold off trial long enough, your sentence was apt to be less.
The toughest sentences came in the beginning.3 73 As you went on, it
was harder and harder to get a case. Whether the Cold War was a
factor, it may have been, but I think it was also what we do know.
We forget about the victims and the new victim is the person
accused, the person on trial, and there is always sympathy. And that
happened, to a certain extent, as the cases went on, in my opinion.
PROFESSOR BUSH: Mr. Jackson, do you want to add to that?
MR. JACKSON: I have nothing to add to what Mr. Wolfe has said
except that, and I didn't have anything to do with the situation, but
I believe that Mr. McCloy convened a so-called clemency panel of
New York and other American lawyers to review the evidence in the
Krupp case to decide and to recommend whether or not the petitions
for clemency should be granted, and that he acted on the basis of
those recommendations.
HONORABLE GOETZ: The recommendations of the clemency
panel have been reproduced in volume fifteen and it doesn't say
anything about the Krupp case. Now I don't know. There may have
been some secret addendum to them that I don't know about.
William Manchester has written a very fascinating book on the Krupp
case, from which I learned a lot of things, including the fact that the
300 "Hungarian Jewesses" were not killed, as Krupp thought they
were going to be.3 74 He says that Benjamin Ferencz, who was an
37 See, e.g., Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
InternationalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 507, 511 (1994).
3"3
After the trials that convicted the German generals to death, following trials had
sentences that were reduced to imprisonment. "It is difficult to avoid the uneasy notion
that a [general] was executed because he came before the tribunal of the first trial instead
of before a later court or preceeding the executive clemency . ..after 1946." See
DAVIDSON, supra note 73, at 593.
314Krupp wanted the women who had originally come to his factory from
Bushenwald to be sent back to Buchenwald before the Americans arrived. However, 384
survived because the SS commandant in charge of Buchenwald rejected them because he
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invaluable prosecutor, made it his business to be in McCloy's
neighborhood when McCloy was reviewing the Krupp sentences and
that the books and the transcripts of the trials were never opened and
nobody was willing to speak to him or see him in connection with the
change in sentences."' Now, this is all based upon what Manchester

says. I know nothing about it. I was back in the United States and
trying to forget the experience.
MR. WOLFE: Anybody who wants to take the time to see what the
clemency board said can come to the National Archives and look at
the record. The full record is there. Not excerpts from it, and you
can judge for yourself.
PROFESSOR WECHSLER: Just a few seconds about retroactivity,
simply to remind the questioner that the basic purpose of the rule
against retroactivity was to protect people against actions being
deemed wrong after they had been committed.
Now, there was no question that, under conditions of modern
warfare and aggression, war was a supreme wrong and the defense
that usually was mounted against killings during the war was
eliminated arguably by the Kellogg-Briand Pact376 and related
documents under which war was not an instrument of national policy.
So that as you look at the underlying purpose of the rule against
retroactivity, it would not have been served by dismissing aggressive
war as something that had not been covered by existing documents3 77
and more important, perhaps, was the point that Justice Jackson made
and that is there was no supreme legislature that defined international
law.
We were in a period comparable to the growth of common

believed he would not be able to kill them all, including those already in the camp,
before the Allies arrived. MANCHESTER, supra note 41, at 560-62, 792.
37 See generally id.
376Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 126.
377 See, e.g., Steven Fogelson, supra note 91, at 865 (stating the proposition that
aggressive war could not be dismissed as something not covered by existing documents,
for "it was not a wholly novel idea to hold agents of foreign governments criminally
liable for violating international law").
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law at the hands of the courts. I think arguably and persuasively that
this growth is analogous to the law concerning aggression, as it was
dealt with in the Charter, and ultimately by the Tribunal.
MR. SPRECHER: There's been some reference to the classification
of certain documents as secret. I know of no case where any
Nuremberg document was classified and not circulated, and I can
speak with a fair amount of specific knowledge.
During the last several months that I was in Nuremberg, the
whole time under Lieutenant Niebenthal and many Germans on his
team, they spent all their time mimeographing, remimeographing, and
making copies of every document and every staff evidence analysis
of every document that had been found and processed into our
document room.
We sent copies of every one of those documents to
universities in this country, including Columbia and Harvard. I
regret to say that a couple of years after I was back I went to
Harvard Law School and asked where these documents were and I
found them in a kind of disassembled state down in a basement room
in the library. However, when I went back again several years later,
having made some protest, they had been organized very well, and
I think that if you want to go to any of the larger universities you can
find access to all these documents.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR BUSH: Thank you, and that wraps up our panel. I
would like to have a very warm hand of applause for all our
participants. At this time, it gives me great pleasure to turn the floor
over to Dr. Stiefel who was introduced to you by Dean Wellington
and will make a few remarks about our honoree. Dr. Stiefel.
Dr. Ernst Stiefel
DR. ERNST STIEFEL: Before making any remarks, I would like
to say, as a condenser as to just happened about classification, that I
happened to be in charge after the occupation of Sicily of the
translation of the Italian Civil Code and it was done by the OSS. It
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was done by the military of services and, to my amazement, I find in
the public library of today that the translation of the civil code of
Italy is still classified.
MR. SPRECHER: Were these documents that should have gone
through Nuremberg?
DR. STIEFEL: No. It is my honor and pleasure to present to
General Taylor, and Professor Taylor, an award for outstanding
contribution to the area of humanity. And that award I base on the
presentation of General Taylor's first speech made as Chief
Prosecutor, in a way which shows a model of modesty and clarity,
and since these records are not easily available, I quote from the
record:
[Presiding judge:] The tribunal is ready to hear the
opening statement of General Taylor.
[General Taylor:] If it pleases the tribunal. The
responsibilities of opening the first trial for capital
transgressions of the laws of nations imposes on the
prosecution, above all things, the obligation of clarity.
The defendants own and exploited enormous and
natural resources had become very wealthy, but these
things are not declared as crimes of law. The law of
nations does not say it is criminal to be rich or
contemptible to be poor. The law of nations arises
out of the standards of common decency and
humanity that all civilized nations accept.
All
civilized men, no matter what the rank or station, are
subject to the law and are bound to observe these
standards. At the threshold of this my case, and
because of the unusual character, is vital that those
principles are clearly understood. The defendants
were powerful and wealthy men of industry, but this
is not their crime. We do not seek to reform the
German economic structure, or the world, or to raise
the standard of living. We seek rather to confirm and
revitalize the ordinary standards of human behavior
important in the law of nations. We charge that the
defendants violated the law and shamelessly
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dishonored the image of mankind on full side of all
men. We charge that they are set at no freedom of
other men and denied the very right to exist by
adjoining the advancement of millions of unfortunate
men and women all over Europe. We accuse them,
finally, of supporting, joining and profiting by the
foulness and most murderous policies and program of
the Third Reich in the cause of its Jewish people were
driven from Germany and all but exterminated
throughout Europe.378
This is the language of General Taylor in his presentation
and, in view of his outstanding performance, is a modesty which you
have shown throughout the four years in which you served as Chief
Prosecutor. I have the honor to give you the award for outstanding
contribution.
I have two additional remarks for General Taylor. First in
your book, General Taylor, you promised or you indicated in your
forward that, "I was appointed Chief of Counsel for War Crimes to
serve as chief prosecutor of these cases, and I hope later to write a
description of these subsequent trials, which involved many
defendants, problems, and decisions quite different from those of the
first Nuremburg trial. , 379 We hope that you will find the time and
the strength to present your story of the subsequent time.
And, as the second additional remark, in a recent interview,
which you gave and which was published, you stated:
I think it is interesting that my book, The Anatomy of
the Nuremberg Trials, is going to be published in
Germany soon. Not one of these six books that I
have done were written in Germany and I was quite
surprised that they took this book. I am interested to
see what's going to happen there.
I returned yesterday from Germany and I saw your book in
German and I saw the reviews, which were in since yesterday about
378See 6 GREEN SERIES, supra note 18, at 78 (Case no. 5, The Flick Case).

3'9See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at xii.
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your book, and I can congratulate you upon the response in
Germany, how acute and how practical and how important your
contribution has been.
Interestingly enough, the Germans do not understood the term
"Anatomy of a Trial" because that term is more or less regulated in
Germany to the medical autopsy. Therefore, your German publisher
was right in changing the name of your book in German, namely, it
does not say anatomy.
It says Hintergrunde, Analysen und
Erkenntnisse, which means background, analysis and consequences
for today. That is what your book brings in an excellent way and all
the responses I got, all the interviews I had are positive and I
congratulate you.

